

Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.

Overview:

The United States has maintained a significant military relationship with Taiwan since the late 20th century, primarily aimed at enhancing the island's defense capabilities against potential aggression from the People's Republic of China (PRC). This relationship has evolved since the establishment of the "One China" policy in 1979, which formally recognized Beijing's claims over Taiwan while allowing the U.S. to continue providing military support through training programs and arms sales. Despite the withdrawal of officially recognized U.S. troops from Taiwan, informal military cooperation persists, underscoring the U.S.'s commitment to Taiwan's self-defense.

U.S. military involvement in Taiwan includes the deployment of small contingents of American troops for training purposes, particularly in areas such as air defense and maritime operations. This support is formalized under the Taiwan Relations Act, which mandates U.S. assistance to bolster Taiwan's defensive capabilities. Recent reports suggest an increased American military presence on the island, including the training of Taiwanese forces by U.S. Marines and the involvement of special operations units in advanced warfare training.

Additional Sources:

<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/>

https://www.roc-taiwan.org/us_en/post/24.html

<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275>

<https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/taiwan-americans-favor-status-quo>

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/experts/taiwan.html>

Affirmative

We stand in affirmation of the following:

Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.

Definitions:

Substantially

Cambridge Dictionary

Cambridge Dictionary, no date "substantially,"

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/substantially>

To a large degree

Military Aid

Collins Dictionary

Collins Dictionary, No date, "MILITARY AID definition in American English,"

<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/military-aid>

Military aid is aid which is used to assist an ally in its defense efforts, or to assist a poor country in maintaining control over its own territory.

Framework

Cost-benefit analysis

The framing for today's round ought to be cost benefit analysis. If we demonstrate that the United States federal government reducing its military support of Taiwan provides more good than harm, we should win the round.

Contention 1: US Military support increases Chinese Aggression

US current strategy of "ambiguity" is not working

Brands 2023

Hal Brands, a professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "Deterrence in Taiwan Is Failing," 9-8-2023. (<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/08/us-military-deterrence-china-taiwan-war-east-asia/>)- JT

"My gut tells me we will fight in 2025," U.S. Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan wrote in a January memo to officers in the Air Mobility Command. The memo, which promptly leaked to reporters, warned that the United States and China were barreling toward a conflict over Taiwan. The U.S. Defense Department quickly distanced itself from Minihan's blunt assessment. Yet the general wasn't saying anything in private that military and civilian officials weren't already saying in public.

In August 2022, a visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had set off the worst cross-strait crisis in a quarter century. China's aircraft barreled across the center line of the Taiwan Strait; its ships prowled the waters around the island; its ballistic missiles splashed down in vital shipping lanes. Months after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had reminded everyone that major war is not an anachronism, the Taiwan crisis made visceral the prospect that a Chinese attack on that island could trigger conflict between the world's two top powers.

Washington certainly took note. A year earlier, the outgoing chief of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, had predicted that a war in the Taiwan Strait could come by 2027. After the August crisis, this "Davidson window" became something like conventional wisdom, with Minihan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and other U.S. officials predicting that trouble might start even sooner. If the

United States and China do clash over Taiwan, it will be the war everyone saw coming—which would make the failure to deter it all the more painful.

Biden knows the threat is rising—he recently called China a “ticking time bomb”—which is why he has repeatedly said Washington won’t stand aside if Beijing strikes. But make no mistake: A great-power war over Taiwan would be cataclysmic. It would feature combat more vicious than anything the United States has experienced in generations. It would fragment the global economy and pose real risks of nuclear escalation. So the crucial question is whether Washington can deter a conflict it hopes never to fight.

Military aid will destabilize the region; demonizing China will make it more aggressive

Pao 2024

Jeff Pao is an editor for Asia Times "Chinese warn of Taiwan crisis from US military aid," 4-23-2024. (<https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/chinese-warn-of-taiwan-crisis-from-us-military-aid/>)-JT

“By providing military aid to Taiwan, the US is trying to stir up a crisis and confrontation in the Taiwan Strait and related region,” Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times in an interview. “The US will then use the chaos and conflicts it creates to make countries in East Asia and Western Pacific regions lean to its side and form an alliance.”

Li said such a move will lead to division in the Asia Pacific region, undermine the important foundation for the stability of Sino-US relations and seriously damage the existing order and security environment for shared prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Xie Feng, Chinese Ambassador to the US, delivered a speech on April 20 at the opening ceremony of the Harvard Kennedy School China Conference 2024.

He warned the US of the consequences of interfering with China’s internal affairs and damaging China’s interests on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet) and the South China Sea. “Applying salami tactics and crossing red lines on issues bearing on others’ core interests is just like racing cars on a cliff’s edge, where a crash is almost inevitable,” he said.

“The Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive issue in China-US relations. The so-called ‘Taiwan independence’ is a dead end, and the one-China principle is a red line not to be crossed,” he said.

Contention 2: Improving US – China Relations

The US should work on coexistence and competition with China- not conflict

Chivvis 2024

Christopher S. Chivvis is a senior fellow and director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has more than two decades of experience working on U.S. foreign policy and national security challenges. "U.S.-China Relations for the 2030s: Toward a Realistic Scenario for Coexistence," 10-17-2024. (<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/us-china-relations-for-the-2030s-toward-a-realistic-scenario-for-coexistence?lang=en>)- JT

The United States has responded with far-reaching economic measures aimed at countering China, measures that deny China access to advanced U.S. technologies, provocative visits by congressional leaders to Taiwan, a diplomatic initiative to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia, and an arms buildup of its own. The consensus that once surrounded a strategy of deep engagement with China has collapsed, and one of the few policy issues that Democrats and Republicans agree on is being much tougher on China. Most recent strategic thinking about China has, accordingly, advocated a more aggressive U.S. approach, with a strong coercive military element and ideological dimension.

These trends can make it difficult to envision what a more stable and predictable relationship between China and America might look like. But doing so is extremely important.

The scenario involves a core geopolitical bargain in which the United States accepts China's continued growth and development but works to balance its regional hegemony and receives reassurance from Beijing that it can be content without global preeminence. For its part, China shows that it does not seek to replace U.S. hegemony with a hegemony of its own, and that it can be satisfied with something approximating equality in East Asia combined with a greater global role—or at least recognizes that this is preferable to gambling on a war or trying to undercut the United States virtually everywhere. In this scenario, China is not intensifying efforts to change the territorial status quo in Taiwan by force, even though it is certain to retain its claim to the island and not to renounce the use of force altogether. Both sides meanwhile compete economically to maximize their national wealth, but they do so in a way that does not intentionally damage the other. Protective "scaffolding" in the form of military crisis-management procedures, arms control, and cooperation on at least some key issues of global governance helps to stabilize the relationship.

To be sure, this scenario will require changes on both sides, and these might never materialize. Trust is seriously lacking between Beijing and Washington, and this makes it much more difficult to pursue policies that move in the more positive direction of this scenario. Leaders in either nation might also just reject this scenario as too limiting of their national ambition and hope to achieve more, no matter the risks. China might be unwilling to make credible commitments to global restraint. The United States might be unwilling to accept any global role for China whatsoever. But the scenario should still be appealing today because it represents a realistic equilibrium, one that allows both sides to flourish in the context of a reduced risk of great power war.

Chinese-American relations are the most important in the world; making them peaceful benefits everyone

Kim, et. al. 2024

Patricia M. Kim received her doctoral degree from the Department of Politics at Princeton University and her bachelor's degree with highest distinction in political science and Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley, Matthew Turpin, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Jessica Chen Weiss, Eun A Jo, Ryan Hass, Emilie Kimball, "Is the US-China relationship the most consequential relationship for America in the world?," 2-6-2024. (<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-us-china-relationship-the-most-consequential-relationship-for-america-in-the-world/>)- JT

The invitation from Brookings' debate organizers asked: "Is the U.S.-China relationship the most consequential bilateral relationship for the United States in the world?"

China is:

one of only two nations that poses an existential threat to the United States.

the only nation that poses a systemic threat to the U.S. position as the global leader, architect, and guardian of the post-World War II international order.

the largest emitter of greenhouse gases—accounting for more emissions in 2022 than the United States and Europe combined.

the second backbone of the world economy: the manufacturing workshop of the world, the No. 1 trading partner of most countries in the world (including the European Union and Japan), and the supplier of most critical items (including everything green and clean) in global supply chains.

both a classic Thucydidean rival and America's inseparable, conjoined Siamese twin.

In short, America cannot escape "China impact." China is big, capable, changing rapidly, and operating in all priority zones. Still, obsessing over what China does or might do is a mistake that will carry large opportunity costs for America that it cannot afford. China may be the most consequential "other country," but we need to take responsibility for our own future, a future that will involve "China impact," but that we can shape.

Chinese American tensions is impacting humanity's scientific progress

Glennon 2024

Britta Glennon is an Assistant Professor of Management at the Wharton School. She received a PhD in Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University, "How Hostile U.S.-China Relations Are Hurting Science," 10-1-2024. (<https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-hostile-u-s-china-relations-are-hurting-science/>)-JT

Escalating political tension between the United States and China is throttling the exchange of scientific research and making it harder for the U.S. to attract and retain talented Chinese scholars, according to a new study co-authored by Wharton management professor Britta Glennon.

“Both countries are focused very much on trying to be self-sufficient in science and less international, and this is the opposite of what the trends have been for a long time,” Glennon said. “There’s more of a nationalist shift. We think there hasn’t been as much consideration of what some of the side effects of that might be [on innovation].”

Glennon spoke to Wharton Business Daily about the working paper titled, “Building a Wall around Science: The Effect of U.S.-China Tensions on International Scientific Research,” which was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research. (Listen to the podcast.) Her co-authors are Robert Flynn, doctoral candidate at Boston University’s Questrom School of Business; Raviv Murciano-Goroff, strategy and innovation professor also at BU Questrom; and Jiusi Xiao, doctoral candidate at Claremont Graduate University.

When countries are actively at war, the wounds to science are clear: collaboration stops, less money is spent, foreign scientists are often deported, and some are even killed. But the effect of a cold war on science is less understood. That’s what the research team wanted to explore.

The scholars analyzed resumes of more than 800,000 American and ethnically Chinese STEM graduates to determine how their careers fared since 2016, when there was a marked downturn in U.S.-China relations with the election of President Donald Trump and the ramp-up of prosecutions of Chinese researchers under what was later known as the China Initiative program. They also examined the amount of published research coming from both groups since then. The results were threefold:

Mobility — Between 2016 and 2019, ethnically Chinese graduate students became 16% less likely to attend a U.S.-based PhD program, and those who did were 4% less likely to stay in the U.S. after graduation. In both instances, these students were more likely to move to a non-U.S. anglophone country, such as Canada or Australia.

Building on Research — There was a sharp decline in Chinese usage of American science, as measured by citations. But there was no such decline in the propensity of U.S. scientists to cite Chinese research.

Productivity — A decline in Chinese usage of U.S. science does not appear to affect the productivity of China-based researchers, as measured by publications. But heightened anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S. appears to have reduced the productivity of ethnically Chinese scientists in the U.S. by 2% to 6%.

Contention 3: Focus on Domestic Microchip Investment

American military equipment for Taiwan is severely mishandled- wasting billions of dollars

Levine 2024

Ben Levine Is A Program Assistant At The Global Taiwan Institute. "Wasted Ammunition in the Fight against Chinese Disinformation," 10-2-2024. (<https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/wasted-ammunition-in-the-fight-against-chinese-disinformation/>)- JT

The Presidential Drawdown Authority allows the US president to pull military equipment (as aid) from US stocks to send to foreign countries. For example, for Fiscal Year 2023, Congress authorized for the president to draw down up to USD \$1 billion specifically for Taiwan. July 2023 was the first instance of the Biden Administration using that funding to send military aid to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) plays a central role in executing the Presidential Drawdown (PD) by issuing the Presidential Drawdown Execution Order (PD EXORD). The report on the PDA process for Taiwan highlights several key issues related to the accountability, quality control, and logistics of military equipment transfers. One of the primary findings is that the DoD's procedures for tracking and managing equipment deliveries were inadequate or nonexistent. Over 340 pallets of equipment suffered water damage at Travis Air Force Base due to poor storage conditions and inefficient airlift scheduling. The report underscores the need for better coordination between the DSCA and military services to avoid delays and ensure proper handling of equipment.

Another critical finding was the delivery of unserviceable or damaged equipment to Taiwan. Items such as wet and moldy body armor and expired ammunition were received, largely because the units in the United States that were responsible for the shipments failed to follow proper packaging and shipping standards. This raised concerns about the US military's preparedness and attention to quality when supplying vital defense materials to allies, particularly during times of heightened geopolitical tension.

The damaged and improperly packaged equipment caused significant financial and operational strain for both the United States and Taiwan. Additionally, the report noted that the Taiwanese government and US agencies had to spend additional resources to remediate or replace the faulty items, resulting in extra costs that could have been avoided with better logistical planning and quality control. Moreover, the delivery of non-mission-capable equipment risks undermining Taiwan's confidence in US defense support, which could have broader implications for security cooperation in the region.

Overall, the findings call for better oversight, improved logistical operations, and a commitment to providing Taiwan with the high-quality defense equipment it needs to maintain its security, particularly as tensions with China escalate. The report highlights not only the technical failures in equipment delivery but also the broader strategic risks posed by lapses in US defense cooperation practices.

In order to improve the delivery of military aid to Taiwan under the PDA, the DoD should conduct a final quality check on all equipment before it reaches Taiwan. Currently, there is no standardized process for ensuring the condition of military aid before it is handed over to Taiwan's MND. This oversight is problematic because damaged or unserviceable equipment, such as expired ammunition and moldy body armor, was delivered in the most recent PD shipment. A final quality assurance check would ensure that all items are mission-ready, up to standards, and capable of being immediately integrated into Taiwan's military. Without this critical step, there is a risk that Taiwan could receive equipment that is not only useless but also costly and time-consuming to replace—thereby undermining the entire purpose of the aid package. Instituting a mandatory, final quality control procedure would greatly enhance the reliability of and allies' trust in US military assistance.

The absence of DoD or AIT representatives on the ground during the handover of military aid is another significant concern. Potentially due to the unique unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, no US personnel are physically present in Taiwan when PDA shipments are transferred. Instead, non-US contractors are responsible for delivering the equipment to Taiwan's MND, creating a gap in oversight and accountability.

There is a \$20 billion backlog of US military aid to Taiwan that Taiwan has yet to receive

Gomez 2024

Eric Gomez is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. His research focuses on the U.S. military budget and force posture, as well as arms control and nuclear stability issues in East Asia. "Taiwan Arms Backlog, June 2024: First Arms Sales to the Lai Ching-te Administration and New Information about Delays," 7-9-2024. (<https://www.cato.org/blog/taiwan-arms-backlog-june-2024-first-arms-sales-lai-ching-te-administration-new-information>) -JT

The backlog of US arms sales to Taiwan grew in June 2024 to \$20.5 billion, an increase of almost \$840 million from the previous month. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, asymmetric capabilities account for the backlog's growth in June.

On June 5, the DSCA announced sales of standard and non-standard spare parts for F-16 fighter aircraft for \$220 million and \$80 million, respectively. We did not include these two sales in the arms backlog dataset because they maintain existing capabilities that Taiwan could use to protect itself, whereas our dataset covers US weapons that Taiwan does not have yet. Sales of F-16 spare parts help Taiwan maintain the aircraft it already possesses, but Washington should not sell Taipei new aircraft. Traditional capabilities, like F-16s, can conduct a wider range of missions than asymmetric capabilities, but their vulnerability to China's superior traditional forces makes them less useful in a high-end conflict.

The two June 2024 FMS cases that are included in the backlog comprise a \$300 million sale of 291 ALTIUS 600-Ms and a \$60 million sale of 720 Switchblade 300s, both of which are loitering munitions—small unmanned aerial vehicles armed with explosives that detonate when the vehicle crashes into a target. Loitering munitions have been used extensively by Ukraine's military against invading Russian forces. For Taiwan, putting many of these capabilities in the hands of small units gives options for conducting precise attacks, even if Taiwan's more advanced strike capabilities like aircraft or artillery are disrupted or destroyed.

A majority of the \$837 million increase in the arms backlog comes from adding old weapons sales back to the backlog. Based on these sources, we added three asymmetric arms sales to the backlog worth a combined \$477 million. According to the MND report, delivery of the Stingers was originally supposed to occur in 2020 (navy sale only) but it was revised twice, first to 2022 and then to no later than 2025 (both navy and army sales). The October 2023 MND report states that since 2021 Taiwan issued two letters of protest to the United States over delays in Stinger deliveries. The 2015 Stinger sale increases the backlog by \$217 million. Per the October 2023 MND report, the initial tranche of 460 missiles was supposed to be delivered by 2022, but this was pushed to late 2023. The June 2024 MND letter goes on to say that none of the 1,700 missiles have arrived due to US production delays and issues with pre-shipment quality control testing. Our dataset already included the 1,240 missiles, but not the 460 missile sales. Based on the new MND letter, we have added the smaller sale to the backlog.

Taiwan's defense minister claimed that all 1,700 TOW missiles will arrive by the end of 2024. Yet the fact remains that Taiwan has not received any of a relatively simple capability first notified to Congress nine years ago.

The State Department is confident that Taiwan will receive these 1,011 loitering munitions by the end of 2025. If this timeline proves accurate, it would be a major success story for a US arms sale to Taiwan. The month of June was a mixed bag for the Taiwan arms sale backlog. The first US arms sales to the Lai administration will advance Taiwan's asymmetric capabilities, which are essential for effective defense against a Chinese invasion. However, new information from Taiwan's MND reveals longer delays for several key asymmetric capabilities.

Current US legislation such as the CHIPS act help but are not enough to bring chip production home

Roy 2024

Diana Roy has previously written on hemispheric affairs for the Center for International Policy and the Inter-American Dialogue. She holds a bachelor's degree in international relations from American University, "The CHIPS Act: How U.S. Microchip Factories Could Reshape the Economy," 10-8-2024. (<https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/chips-act-how-us-microchip-factories-could-reshape-economy>)- JT

In 2022, President Joe Biden signed into law the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act. The legislation directs hundreds of billions of dollars toward supercharging domestic production of advanced technologies such as semiconductors—also known as microchips or chips. The law commits roughly \$280 billion—a mix of direct subsidies and tax incentives—to the tech sector. More than \$70 billion of that is aimed at the chips industry, including investments in high-technology manufacturing, scientific research and development (R&D), and workforce development.

The U.S. Commerce Department is distributing most funds to private industry over a five-year period. Smaller sums are channeled through the Departments of Defense and State to fund research and training and address global supply chain issues. Meanwhile, a semiconductor investment tax credit worth approximately \$24 billion is in effect until 2027.

The CHIPS Act is part of a larger government effort to create jobs, revitalize domestic supply chains, and increase the U.S. production of critical technologies.

Despite producing close to 40 percent of the world's semiconductor supply in 1990, the United States now manufactures only about 12 percent [PDF], and none of the most advanced types. In contrast, more than half of all semiconductors and some 90 percent of the world's most advanced chips are made in Taiwan, predominantly by industry giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC).

Chips are crucial to modern life, powering a vast array of products including cars, computers, phones, and weapons systems. Supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic shook the global economy, driving growing concerns that a potential China-Taiwan conflict could cripple Western access to the chips market. More broadly, there is a growing fear that lagging behind China in such critical technologies will undermine U.S. national security and economic competitiveness.

Despite the difficulties, many experts see the CHIPS Act as a turning point in reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. They say that combined with similar investments and export controls by allies such as Japan and the European Union, the global economy will be better insulated from any China-related shock—though they predict that Taiwan will likely retain a dominant position in the industry for decades to come.

Extensions: US manufacturing is key

US investment in chip manufacturing is key to maintain leverage over China

Mervis 2022

Jeffrey Mervis has covered science policy for more than 30 years, including a stint at Nature, and joined Science in 1993. "To beat China, new U.S. law offers billions for microchip research and training," 6 Sep 2022. (<https://www.science.org/content/article/beat-china-new-u-s-law-offers-billions-microchip-research-and-training>) -JT

Most of the \$280 billion in a new law to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor industry and keep the country ahead of China in technology is a 5-year promise, not a reality. But along with the aspirational spending, the recently passed CHIPS and Science Act commits some \$13 billion right now for research and training in microelectronics. And U.S. universities are now forming large coalitions with companies and local governments in order to be ready to compete for the money as soon as a trio of federal agencies announces its plans.

"No sane university with a strong interest in microelectronics is sitting this out," says Jesús del Alamo, professor of electrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which is involved with several such partnerships.

The act, signed into law on 9 August, funnels \$11 billion over 5 years to the U.S. Department of Commerce to create a National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) and a national advanced packaging manufacturing program. Another \$2 billion will go to the Department of Defense (DOD) for a microelectronics commons, a national network of university laboratories to develop prototypes for the next generation of semiconductor technologies.

American embargos or sanctions are not enough to compete against China or compare to Taiwan- legislation/federal funding is key

Shiffman 2023

John Shiffman is an editor for Reuters, "US wants to contain China's chip industry. This startup shows it won't be easy," 9-6-2023. (<https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-wants-contain-chinas-chip-industry-this-startup-shows-it-wont-be-easy-2023-12-29/>)- JT

Last year, a veteran Silicon Valley software executive took the helm of a startup in his native China, company records show. The startup told potential investors it would sell microchip design software that is mostly available from just a handful of large Western companies. The coveted and highly specialized software tool, known by its initials of OPC, is used in the design of many microchips and is crucial to the design of advanced chips. The production of advanced chips is one of the most contentious technological struggles now dividing the United States and China as they vie for economic and military supremacy. Washington is trying to curb China's access to sensitive microchip design tools.

In a 2022 business-plan presentation prepared for investors, SEIDA called OPC "indispensable technology" and said it would offer the tool by early 2024. A Chinese version of the product, SEIDA said, would "break through the foreign monopoly," helping China become self-reliant in chip technology. SEIDA's ultimate goal, according to one slide: "Become OPC leader in the world."

One backer, recent corporate filings reviewed by Reuters show, is an investment arm of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp, or SMIC. The state-backed, Shanghai-based company is China's leading maker of microchips. U.S. companies are restricted by Washington from providing technology to SMIC without a special license because its alleged work with China's military is considered a threat to American national security. Since SEIDA's launch in October 2021, the U.S. government has increased efforts to curb China's access to EDA tools, developed and sold mostly by American companies.

Through export controls and other restrictions, Washington aims to prevent China from obtaining know-how that could allow it to match microchip advances by the United States and its allies, including Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China and the world's leading chip manufacturer. In email exchanges with Reuters, Chang said U.S. restrictions were one of the reasons Zhang and his colleagues left Siemens EDA for SEIDA to begin with. The restrictions, he wrote, limited their business opportunities at Siemens EDA, "diminishing scope for career advancement and involvement in key projects."

US sanctions designed to cut China off from certain chips is the kind of chips China is currently manufacturing

Seitz 2023

Patrick Seitz is an editor at Investor's Business Daily "Why U.S. Chip Sanctions Against China Aren't Working," 12-7-2023. (<https://www.investors.com/news/technology/semiconductor-stocks-gear-makers-getting-china-boost/>)- JT

U.S. trade restrictions were supposed to slow China's chip industry ambitions. But that hasn't really happened, which has had a mixed impact on semiconductor stocks. "If anything, the sanctions have had the opposite effect," Robert Maire, president of consulting firm Semiconductor Advisors, told Investor's Business Daily.

The U.S. export restrictions seek to prevent China from getting advanced chips it could use for military purposes, including artificial intelligence applications. That has cut off China as a market for the latest graphics processors from Nvidia (NVDA) and AMD (AMD). The sanctions also cut off imports of high-end semiconductor equipment. However, China has loaded up on other gear to make chips — including some types the U.S. had hoped to prevent.

Last quarter, Chinese chipmakers, led by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), gorged on chip gear from Applied Materials (AMAT), ASML (ASML), KLA (KLAC) and Lam Research (LRCX). Those semiconductor stocks now are trading near recent or even record highs.

"Virtually half of all the semiconductor equipment being sold on the planet now is going to China," Maire said. "China is ordering equipment faster and in a more furious manner because they think they're going to be cut off," he added. "So, they're trying to order everything that isn't nailed down in the meantime. That's one of the reasons for the crazy ramp in what they've been getting. Because they've been trying to get it in before the real restrictions hit."

In fact, the agency keeping track of the implications of trade ties with China downplayed the impact of the trade curbs. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission said in a 741-page report published Nov. 15 that China sanctions have been ineffective.

The agency said Chinese firms have been able to buy U.S. semiconductor equipment for making chips at the 14-nanometer node or smaller, despite U.S. restrictions at those dimensions, Reuters reported. "Importers are often able to purchase the equipment if they claim it is being used on an older production line," the commission said. "And with limited capacity for end-use inspections, it is difficult to verify the equipment is not being used to produce more advanced chips."

If China achieves microchip self-sufficiency, China has no reason to hold back from invading Taiwan- Something military aid does not impact at all

Ong 2024

Kenneth Ong holds a master's degree in applied economics from the University of Maryland College Park and a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Economics from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. "China's Defiant Chip Strategy," 6-28-2024. (<https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/06/chinas-defiant-chip-strategy/>)- JT

Semiconductors, or chips, are the backbone of the modern global economy as they are vital to telecommunications, defense, and industrial applications. In recent years, semiconductors have emerged as a critical battleground in the broader geopolitical contest between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. In 2015, the PRC launched the "Made in China 2025" initiative as the roadmap for technological self-reliance. The initiative aimed to transform China's manufacturing sector into a high-tech leader. A key aspect of this industrial policy was to boost domestic chip production by 40 percent in 2020 and 70 percent in 2025, thereby reducing dependence on foreign technology.

China's emergence as a major chip producer could disrupt the global chip supply chain, affecting export-dependent economies like the Republic of China (Taiwan), home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), one of the world's largest and leading chip manufacturers alongside South Korea's Samsung. TSMC produces 90 percent of the world's most advanced chips, with the PRC relying on the Republic of China for 60 percent of chip imports. Achieving self-sufficiency in chip production would undermine Taiwan's "silicon shield," a status quo that deters China from forcefully taking over the island. According to a research report from RAND, given the heavy concentration of global fabrication in Taiwan and the critical role of semiconductors across various sectors of the economy, economic vulnerability could grant the PRC an uneven advantage. Furthermore, semiconductors also play an important role in China's military-civil fusion strategy, a policy to transform the People's Liberation Army into a world-class military with technological superiority. This strategic initiative has raised concerns in Washington, leading to a series of sanctions and export controls designed to restrain China's technological and military advancements.

China's relentless drive toward technological self-reliance in the semiconductor industry has intensified its geopolitical rivalry with the United States. Despite facing rigorous export controls from the United States, the PRC has demonstrated resilience and progress, exemplified by Huawei's advanced seven-nanometer chipset. However, the path to full self-sufficiency remains fraught. Not only is self-sufficiency costly, but Huawei and SMIC also still face limited access to critical tools like EUVs needed to produce advanced chips, and replicating the technology is considered impossible without ASML's industrial

expertise. Moreover, the ambitious goals set for “Made in China 2025” continue to draw skepticism. The unfolding dynamics between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in this high-stakes technological arena highlight the broader implications for the global chip supply chain and international relations. The PRC’s pursuit of semiconductor self-sufficiency could destabilize the global economy, shift the balance of power in favor of the PRC, and heighten national security concerns by escalating geopolitical tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Military buildup does not impact superiority compared to microchip capabilities

Alperovitch 2024

Dmitri Alperovitch is an editor at The Washington Post "Opinion," 4-29-2024.

(<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/29/china-us-computer-chip-strategy-breakout-free-taiwan/>)- JT

China, as large and economically powerful as it is, does not yet possess the ability or knowledge to build the sophisticated machinery one needs to manufacture the most advanced chips.

That’s why China has been stockpiling as much Western equipment for making chips as it can procure. Largely cut off from acquiring the machinery needed for manufacturing advanced chips by the Biden administration’s export controls, it has been pumping money into older, more established chip designs while engaging in price-dumping to boost Chinese firms’ global market share. But its ambitions do not stop there. China eventually seeks to follow the lead of chipmaking powerhouse Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. and build up its domestic capability to manufacture advanced semiconductors. Such a technological breakthrough would be a major geopolitical milestone, eliminating the Chinese economy’s reliance on imported semiconductors from the West — irrevocably altering the balance of power in the new cold war that is unfolding between China and the United States.

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Any U.S. strategy to avoid losing global influence and power to China requires ensuring that China neither achieves a tipping point of domestic independence in the means of production of semiconductors nor seizes Taiwan and its valuable fabs, thereby making the rest of the world dependent on China for chips. Because, as important as chips are to today’s world, they’re going to be even more important tomorrow.

Advanced semiconductors are critical to four main categories of products: advanced weapons systems such as guidance systems for precision munitions; high-end electronics such as iPhones, laptops and computers; gaming systems such as Xboxes and PlayStations; and the massive cloud-computing data centers run by giants such as Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud. This last category is where the entire internet lives and breathes, and where the world’s most sophisticated AI models are being trained on computer systems thousands of times more powerful than a regular desktop.

To maintain leverage over China in the next quarter-century, the United States needs to ensure that China doesn't achieve its much-desired "chip breakout." Luckily, the United States has tremendous power here. The second component of the strategy involves diversifying chip manufacturing away from Taiwan. The extreme concentration of global chip production on an island roughly the size of Maryland is a critical vulnerability not just for the United States but also for the whole world.

The potential that China might blockade or invade Taiwan and hold the United States and the rest of the world hostage by blocking access to TSMC-produced semiconductors is a mortal economic threat that we cannot risk. The answer here — as with reducing U.S. economic reliance on the Chinese chip industry — is greater domestic and allied investment.

The primary goal behind the 2022 Chips Act was to increase the market share of U.S. chips production after it fell from 37 percent in the 1990s to just 12 percent in 2022. By providing government incentives for American and allied companies, such as Samsung and TSMC, to build fabs in the United States, we secure the supply chain in two ways, at both the top and bottom of the process. Though we won't be completely independent of Taiwanese chips anytime soon, the Chips Act helps ensure that our supply of semiconductors is slowly diversified away from vulnerable Taiwan, while providing American chipmaking tool companies a larger domestic market that can offset any loss of access in China caused by U.S. export controls.

In addition, the Chips Act has helped to start a new "chips race," with countries such as South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Germany and France, among others, rushing to provide their own subsidies and incentives to global chip companies to build plants within their borders. While the Chips Act's \$76 billion top-line number is a drop in the bucket considering that just one modern advanced fab could cost as much as \$10 billion, the total announced and planned investments in this industry through 2030 by the United States and its international partners in both the public and private sectors is estimated to be over \$1.2 trillion, according to calculations by my research analysts at Silverado Policy Accelerator.

That level of investment will transform the industry, diversify it and advance it at a pace that was unimaginable just two years ago.

Extensions: Military aid causes Chinese Aggression leading to Great Power War

The best way to prevent China from attacking Taiwan is convincing Xi that war is destructive for China

Rogin 2021

Josh Rogin George Washington University, BA in International Affairs 2001; Sophia University, Tokyo
"Opinion," 4-21-2021 (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/>) - JT

President Xi Jinping has called on China's People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force by 2027. The United States, together with regional partners, must ensure a Chinese invasion can't succeed. That plan hinges on quickly building and deploying thousands of new drones that would swarm the Taiwan Strait and keep China's military busy until more help can arrive, according to the top U.S. military official in the Pacific. But time is running out to turn these plans into a reality.

Under its long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity," the United States has never committed to coming to Taiwan's defense if China attacks. President Biden has repeatedly said he would send the U.S. military to defend Taiwan, although he added a new caveat in his latest interview with Time, saying, "It would depend on the circumstances." President Donald Trump seems less likely to intervene on Taiwan's behalf, having told a GOP senator while in office that if China attacks, "there isn't a f----- thing we can do about it."

For any U.S. president, to send American men and women to defend a small democracy on the other side of the world would be a very tough call. That's why Plan A is to deter Xi from ever attempting an invasion, by making sure that he never looks across the Taiwan Strait and sees an easy victory, Adm. Samuel Paparo, the new head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told me in an interview.

"They want to offer the world a short, sharp war so that it is a fait accompli before the world can get their act together," Paparo told me on the sidelines of the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "My job is to ensure that between now and 2027 and beyond, the U.S. military and the allies are capable of prevailing." China's likely strategy is to overwhelm Taiwan with a massive attack with little warning, Paparo said. Xi doesn't want to repeat Russian President Vladimir Putin's mistake in Ukraine in 2022, when Russia's initial full-scale invasion failed and devolved into a long war of attrition.

China feels disrespected and unrecognized leading it to use aggression as a means to prove itself as a rising power; military aids adds to that mentality

Fan Hongda is a Professor of the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, China "Legislative warfare: Deteriorating bilateral US-China relations," 7-8-2024. (<https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/legislative-warfare-deteriorating-bilateral-us-china-relations>)- JT

Based on these perceptions, the U.S. has continuously proposed bills and measures to contain China, and as late as 2018, it began to pursue dealing with China from "a Position of Strength." This is precisely the key reason Beijing believes U.S.-China relations have deteriorated. China contends that, "The United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength ... this is not the way to deal with the Chinese people."

China believes that the dilemma in bilateral relations is entirely caused by the U.S. From China's perspective, the U.S. has failed to properly address China's development and rise, has interfered in China's internal affairs, and has undermined international peace, thus bearing full responsibility for the deterioration of the relationship between the two countries.

Given the two countries' diametrically opposed perceptions of bilateral relations, it is clear that the U.S. and China have not yet found a path to easing tensions, and their confrontation will continue and even intensify. Although the bills targeting China passed by the House of Representatives are still far from becoming official national laws and might ultimately not become law, the "China Week" itself has already demonstrated how bad Sino-U.S. relations are.

China explicitly dissented military aid to Taiwan; making it more difficult to lower tensions and therefore aggression

AP News 2024

AP News The Associated Press is an American not-for-profit news agency headquartered in New York City. Founded in 1846, it operates as a cooperative, unincorporated association, and produces news reports that are distributed to its members, major U.S. daily newspapers and radio and television broadcasters. "China blasts US military aid to Taiwan, saying the island is entering a 'dangerous situation'," 4-23-2024. (<https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-military-assistance-e505267d2fc595be2d45b2e70d6d1ead>) - JT

China on Wednesday blasted the latest package of U.S. military assistance to Taiwan on Wednesday, saying that such funding was pushing the self-governing island republic into a "dangerous situation."

The U.S. Senate late Tuesday passed \$95 billion in war aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan after months of delays and contentious debate over how involved the United States should be in foreign wars. China claims the entire island of Taiwan as its own territory and has threatened to take it by force if necessary.

The mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office said the aid "seriously violates" U.S. commitments to China and "sends a wrong signal to the Taiwan independence separatist forces." Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian added that Taiwan's ruling pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, which won a third four-year presidential term in January, is willing to "become a pawn for external forces to use Taiwan to contain China, bringing Taiwan into a dangerous situation."

On Tuesday, Taiwan's President-elect Lai Ching-te told a visiting U.S. Congressional delegation that the aid package would "strengthen the deterrence against authoritarianism in the West Pacific ally chain" and "help ensure peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and also boost confidence in the region."

China says Taiwan military aid increases risk of war

Welle 2024

Deutsche Welle, commonly shortened to DW, is a German public, state-owned international broadcaster funded by the German federal tax budget "US aid for Taiwan 'will only increase tensions,'

China says" 04/24/2024. (<https://www.dw.com/en/us-aid-for-taiwan-will-only-increase-tensions-china-says/a-68905536>)-JT

China on Wednesday decried a fresh package of US military aid for Taiwan, which is intended to boost the island's defenses in the case of a possible Chinese invasion.

The US Senate passed the \$8 billion (€7.48 billion) military aid package late Tuesday, as part of larger legislation that includes fresh assistance for Israel and Ukraine. Having already passed the House, US President Joe Biden later on Wednesday signed the package into law.

"I'd like to emphasize that the United States and Taiwan strengthening military ties will not bring about security for Taiwan," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said. He said the assistance "will only increase tensions and the risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait." A Chinese spokesperson for the mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhu Fenglian, said the aid violates US commitments to China and "sends a wrong signal to the Taiwan independence separatist forces."

China does not view Taiwan as a separate country, but rather as a breakaway province. The Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, with the communists taking control of the Chinese mainland and the nationalist Kuomintang retreating to Taiwan. The US aid package will help modernize Taiwan's forces as China frequently conducts military maneuvers near the island.

Western leaders such as Biden have expressed concerns that China may take control of Taiwan by force in the coming years. A Chinese invasion would not only cost human lives, but it could be a massive blow to the global economy — the island is a major producer of semiconductor chips which are used in everything from cellphones to automobiles.

An increasingly aggressive China will increase risk of war

Kelly 2023

Laura Kelly is the foreign policy reporter for The Hill, covering how politics on Capitol Hill collides with the goals of the president and the State Department in America's engagement abroad "US warns China's 'growing aggressiveness' raises risk of conflict" 6-5-2023.

(<https://thehill.com/policy/international/4035312-us-warns-chinas-growing-aggressiveness-raises-risk-of-conflict/>)- JT

China is growing more aggressive against the U.S. military around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, White House national security spokesman John Kirby said Monday, warning Beijing that "it won't be long before somebody gets hurt."

The remarks from the White House come after the U.S. Navy on Monday criticized the Chinese military over an "unsafe" maneuver by one of its ships crossing the path of a U.S. warship at 150 yards of distance in the Taiwan Strait. "There was absolutely no need for the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to act as aggressively as they did," Kirby said, speaking at the White House Press briefing, referring to the formal name of the Chinese military.

“These are part and parcel of an increasing level of aggressiveness by the PRC’s military, particularly in the area of the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea,” Kirby said. China views as a provocation U.S. military air and seacraft transiting the Taiwan Strait, with Beijing claiming the waterway does not constitute international waters and instead is part of a larger dispute over Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governed island of Taiwan. “China resolutely opposes the country concerned stirring up trouble in the Taiwan Strait and is firmly determined to defend its sovereignty and security and regional peace and stability,” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said in a press conference Monday, referring to the U.S.

The confrontation between the Chinese and U.S. warships comes as two senior American diplomats are in Beijing for rare, face-to-face talks on U.S. and China relations.

Negative

We stand in negation of the following:

Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.

Definitions:

Substantially

Cambridge Dictionary

Cambridge Dictionary, no date "substantially,"
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/substantially>

To a large degree

Military Aid

Collins Dictionary

Collins Dictionary, No date, "MILITARY AID definition in American English,"
<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/military-aid>

Military aid is aid which is used to assist an ally in its defense efforts, or to assist a poor country in maintaining control over its own territory.

Framework

Cost-benefit analysis

The framing for today's round ought to be cost benefit analysis. If we demonstrate that the United States federal government reducing its military support of Taiwan provides more harm than good, we should win the round.

Contention 1: American skepticism

American strategy of ambiguity is causing Taiwan to doubt American support

Hanlon et. al. 2024

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy and budgets, the use of military force, and American national security policy. Graham T. Allison, Josh M. Cartin, Elizabeth Economy, Susan A. Thornton, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, Emilie Kimball, "Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?," April 16, 2024 (<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/>)-JT

Known more politely as a policy of "dual deterrence," the idea of maintaining uncertainty about any American role in a future war has been intended to persuade both Taiwan and China not to take actions that the United States would find unacceptable. For Taiwan, that would mean unilateral pursuit or a declaration of independence (or perhaps the development of a nuclear bomb); for China, that would mean a military attack on Taiwan designed to force reunification with the mainland.

Such deliberate muddying of the deterrence waters has generally been thought to be a bad idea in modern American foreign policy—with an unredeemed legacy from Korea to Kuwait and beyond. For Taiwan, however, such a policy has enjoyed support for four decades.

A number of American scholars and officials now want to end the ambiguity, which they say is bad for deterrence. Given China’s greatly increased power in modern times, the traditional logic of a policy that sought in Goldilocks-style to perfectly balance between hot and cold options is no longer compelling, these critics say. The danger of an emboldened China lashing out has become substantially greater than the risks of Taiwan leaders throwing caution to the wind and pursuing independence recklessly in the false belief that America will always grant them a get-out-of-jail-free card.

At one level, these critics make a valid case. Beijing cannot be allowed to develop the misimpression that the United States might truly do nothing if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked Taiwan. However, it is not that simple. Asserting that the United States should defend Taiwan under any circumstances presupposes that we could do so successfully. It also risks causing a huge crisis just by the simple declaration of Washington’s new stance on the situation.

The US is already being seen as an unreliable NATO ally by American allies

Lawless 2024

Jill Lawless is an editor at Chicago Tribune "Allies fear the US is becoming less reliable, with growing concern over a possible Trump return," 2/11/2024.

(<https://www.chicagotribune.com/2024/02/10/allies-fear-the-us-is-becoming-less-reliable-with-growing-concern-over-a-possible-trump-return/>)- JT

Many worry that a second term for Trump would be an earthquake, but tremors already abound — and concerns are rising that the U.S. could grow less dependable regardless of who wins. With a divided electorate and gridlock in Congress, the next American president could easily become consumed by manifold challenges at home — before even beginning to address flashpoints around the world, from Ukraine to the Middle East.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent verdict was blunt: America’s “first priority is itself.”

The first Trump administration stress-tested the bonds between the U.S. and its allies, particularly in Europe. Trump derided the leaders of some friendly nations, including Germany’s Angela Merkel and Britain’s Theresa May, while praising authoritarians such as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin. He has called China’s Xi Jinping “brilliant” and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán “a great leader.” In campaign speeches, Trump remains skeptical of organizations such as NATO, often lamenting the billions the U.S. spends on the military alliance whose support has been critical to Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion. He said at a rally on Saturday that, as president, he’d warned NATO allies he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to countries that didn’t pay

their way in the alliance. Trump also wrote on his social media network that in future the U.S. should end all foreign aid donations and replace them with loans.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warned that Trump risked endangering U.S. troops and their allies. "Any suggestion that allies will not defend each other undermines all of our security, including that of the U.S., and puts American and European soldiers at increased risk," he said in a statement Sunday. Biden, meanwhile, has made support for Ukraine a key priority and moral imperative. But Biden's assertion after his election in 2020 that "America is back" on the global stage has not been entirely borne out. Congressional Republicans have stalled more military aid for Ukraine, while America's influence has been unable to contain conflict in the Middle East

Thomas Gift, director of the Centre on U.S. Politics at University College London, said that whoever wins the presidential race, the direction of travel will be the same – toward a multipolar planet in which the United States is no longer "the indisputable world superpower." Most allied leaders refrain from commenting directly on the U.S. election, sticking to the line that it's for Americans to pick their leader.

They are conscious that they will have to work with the eventual winner, whoever it is — and behind the scenes, governments will be doing the "backroom work" of quietly establishing links with the contenders' political teams, said Richard Dalton, a former senior British diplomat. But many of America's European NATO allies are worried that with or without Trump, the U.S. is becoming less reliable. Some have started to talk openly about the need for members to ramp up military spending, and to plan for an alliance without the United States.

Taiwan is uncertain of American commitment to defending it in the event of a Chinese invasion

Shun 2023

Yang Kuang-Shun is an editor for the National Interest "The Roots of Taiwanese Skepticism of American Commitment," 9-2-2023. (<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/roots-taiwanese-skepticism-american-commitment-206760>)-JT

Like the archetypal orphan of Jungian psychology, many Taiwanese people are haunted by feelings of detachment, insecurity, and distrust toward others and yearn for a stronger security commitment from the United States. Meanwhile, the prevalent sense of doubt or skepticism regarding the dedication to defending the island persists. If left unchecked, these narratives could undermine the relationship between Taiwan and the United States and imperil the strategic unity of Indo-Pacific democracies—a situation that the People's Republic of China (PRC) would no doubt exploit.

In essence, skepticism of the commitment to Taiwan's defense centers around the perception of three key factors: the perceived balance of power between Washington and Beijing, the perceived level of American commitment, and the perceived image of the United States as a great power. These perceptions are just that, and they do not necessarily stem from concrete realities. Thus, Beijing intends to manipulate the Taiwanese populace's perception by fostering the belief in Chinese omnipotence: the island is indefensible, America is unreliable, and unification is inevitable.

For many skeptics in Taiwan, the hegemonic decline of the United States is evident in its inglorious exit from Afghanistan and its reluctance to intervene decisively in the Russia-Ukraine War. Islanders interpret these events as foreshadowing the eventual American failure to confront China on behalf of Taiwan. Adding to this perspective, certain theorists suggest that Washington views Taipei as a strategic pawn, using it to contain China by inciting a cross-strait war before consolidating its position as the world's sole superpower. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the United States' capability to deter a potential Chinese invasion in Taiwan, a prevalent distrust towards the defense commitment endures. This sentiment partially results from the island's historical experiences of feeling "abandoned" by its rulers and allies, whether the Dutch, Chinese, or Japanese.

Another source of distrust stems from the policy of "strategic ambiguity," in which the United States neither commits nor rules out defending Taiwan in the case of Chinese coercion. Unlike formal military alliances, such as NATO, where the principle of collective defense binds members together, Taiwan is not a treaty ally. The shift of diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 further precluded an alliance.

Contention 2: Taiwan's American and Global importance

US, American Allies, and Global economy all have a stake in Taiwanese stability and protection

Sacks 2023

David Sacks is a fellow for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau. "Why Is Taiwan Important to the United States?," 6-20-2023. (<https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states>)- JT

China is intensifying its military, economic, and diplomatic coercion of Taiwan, which it considers a piece of lost territory that must be returned, by force if necessary. While a war between China and the United States over Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable, rising tensions raise important first-order questions that need to be addressed: Why does Taiwan matter and why should Americans care about its fate? How would Chinese aggression against Taiwan impact the United States? What, if anything, can and should be done to protect U.S. interests?

While the United States is thousands of miles from Taiwan, the island's fate will have major implications for U.S. security and prosperity. What happens in the Taiwan Strait will also bear on fundamental questions of international order and the future of democracy.

U.S. allies would come to question whether the United States would or even could come to their defense. Having lost confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security, allies would contemplate either accommodating China or hedging against it by growing their militaries or even developing nuclear weapons. Either outcome would result in diminished U.S. influence and increased regional and global instability.

A Chinese attack on Taiwan, regardless of its success or whether the United States chose to intervene, would also trigger a global economic depression and shave trillions of dollars off global economic output. Taiwanese companies manufacture nearly 70 percent of the world's semiconductors and around 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If the world loses Taiwan's production capacity, no other company will be able to fill the gap in the short term. During a Chinese blockade or attack, the production and shipment of semiconductors would come to a halt, leading to a shortage of nearly every product that contains technology, from smartphones to computers and cars. Companies across a range of industries would have to reduce or even halt production.

If China secures Taiwan, it will dominate the world instantly

Colby 2022

Elbridge A. Colby is a principal at The Marathon Initiative. He is the author of *The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict* from Yale University Press "Why Protecting Taiwan Really Matters to the U.S.," Oct 11, 2022. (<https://time.com/6221072/why-protecting-taiwan-really-matters-to-the-u-s/>)- JT

While steps to strengthen our economy at home make abundant sense, this approach will not suffice for Americans' concrete interests. We cannot let Asia go.

If we identify the threats to those goods, by far the most dangerous is a very great power that could attack or undermine them. "Hard" power, namely economic strength and the military might it can provide, is the main thing. Lesser threats by definition can be dealt with more easily. America is roughly 20% of global GDP, and economic productivity is the root of power in the modern world, so this means that only a very great state could hope to become so strong as to menace us. And the only state today that matches up to that description is China.

But China on its own is not strong enough. It too is roughly 20% of global GDP. So how could China pose such a threat to our interests? By dominating Asia. Asia is now again the center of the world, upwards of 50% of global GDP going forward. If Beijing could dominate Asia, it would be in a very strong position to dominate the world—and us.

Now is China actually going to pursue this goal? This could have been the topic of a good debate a decade ago. But now the answer seems fairly clearly to be yes. Beijing's behavior, and at a deeper level China's interests, all point in the direction of Beijing pursuing a form of soft imperial control—what we might call hegemony—over Asia. This would likely take the form of formally independent states in Asia orienting their economic, foreign, and security—and ultimately even their domestic affairs—around Beijing's preferences. Beijing would not directly control them, but it would be the center and leader of the system, and would have immense leverage to enforce its will.

If China becomes dominant in such a way over Asia it will have a controlling influence over roughly half of the global economy. With this power, it will undoubtedly ensure that it is the center, the prime beneficiary, and effectively the director of the global economy. And why not? In this context, Beijing

could ensure that China is the richest, most economically secure, and most influential country in the world.

In such a scenario, global trade and commercial flows will gravitate toward and around China. China will have a scale and power to ensure that its companies are the world leaders, that its universities are the best, that its standards are met, and that its rules are followed. It will be the gatekeeper to the world's largest market area, with unmatched scale—which is of course key to economic development. To those who play ball with such a China, falling into line in its value chain, following its rules, and toeing its diplomatic line, there will be rewards. But for those who resist, there will be penalties: exclusion from access, tariffs, and sanctions. Think of the economic power America can now wield against Russia in Beijing's hands, and at even greater scale.

Taiwan is essential for every product in the world

Wang 2022

Mei-Hua Wang, who is the minister of economic affairs for Taiwan, appointed to that position in June of 2020. "Why Taiwan Matters," 10-12-2022. (<https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-taiwan-matters-economic-perspective>)- JT

With that in mind, if Taiwan were to become under threat or be in crisis, it will not only have a severe impact on global shipping and logistics but it would also have an impact on the political and economic order of the Indo-Pacific. And not only does Taiwan hold a vital geostrategic position, it's also a thriving hub for international trade, making it a very critical global supply chain partner. Last year, Taiwan became the world's sixteenth largest trading economy with trade exceeding \$800 billion U.S. for the first time in Taiwan's history.

Moreover, as a vital ally of the United States, our bilateral trade relations have continued to grow. In 2021, we became United States' largest trading partner. The bilateral trade in goods surpassed \$100 billion U.S. for the first time. But the substantial relations were much far beyond the figures.

Of course, our trade performance is supported by the foundation of our industrial strengths. Taiwan has the advantage of having an ecosystem of friendly industrial cluster, which allow for the highly effective industrial supply chain that are able to quickly respond to market changes. This makes it possible for us to provide the world with innovative high-quality products.

For example, Taiwan accounts for 80 percent of the global market's share of laptops and the motherboards, and 60 percent of the world's network devices are manufactured by Taiwan. And our bicycle brands include Giant and Merida are well known around the world and we are the fifth largest exporter of machine tools with a high cost performance ratio, and we also have 70 percent of all functional textile and apparel come from Taiwan. We manufacture for brands such as Adidas, Nike, Lululemon, and Under Armour. Of course, Taiwan's bubble tea is also well known around the world.

And for decades the United States has been Taiwan's most important partner thanks to our deep cooperation and the vibrant economic, trading, and cultural relationship. Taiwanese businesses also

consider U.S. company to be vital economic partners. Both sides have established strong supply chain relationships over the years.

For example, Taiwanese company have long-term relationships with the leading U.S. brand of consumer electronics, such as Apple, Dell, HP, and many other companies. Taiwan's role have evolved from the OEM/ODM model to the EMS. EMS is electronic manufacturing services. Services that is – may also include design.

So for these reasons, U.S. company global deployment strategy plays a very key role in guiding the investment direction of Taiwanese company.

Contention 3: China learning from Russia-Ukraine War to improve strategy for Taiwan

China has been keeping note of American mistakes and weak points during the Russia Ukraine war

Culver 2023

John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs. Aagachi, "US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions," 6-15-2023. (<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-lessons-from-ukraine/>)-JT

Beijing likely is also watching closely to see how deeply entrenched in—or distracted by—the Ukraine conflict the United States becomes, where it contributes the lion's share of direct military aid, including key munitions and weapons platforms that are in short supply; Ukraine is currently expending US annual production of nine thousand HIMARS missiles every two months. As Russia continues to achieve reduced war aims in the east and south, the war seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It presents new opportunities for fissures in the Alliance, and reduced US strategic standing headed into US presidential elections in 2024 that are likely to be even more disruptive than previous election campaigns after former US President Donald Trump's March 30 grand-jury indictment on business-fraud charges. Partly because of Washington's massive arms support for Ukraine, its deliveries of key weapons and munitions already sold to Taiwan have been significantly delayed.

But one momentous strategic implication of Russia's invasion is probably already clear to Xi and the CCP. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the prospect of major-power military conflict, and even nuclear-weapons use, is again a characteristic of the global order. Russia's gamble in Ukraine that it could quickly defeat a non-NATO European neighbor and secure its near abroad has so far failed, but US-led Western unity and imposition of sanctions against Moscow have the earmarks of a protracted conflict that could drive new instability. If Beijing concludes that this is a characteristic of geopolitics and great-power competition in the twenty-first century, it could increase Chinese preparations for military conflict in Asia with either the United States or its proxies.

The deepening enmity of US-China strategic rivalry since 2017 has already eroded core CCP assumptions that competition would remain bounded by nuclear deterrence, deep economic integration, shared stewardship of financial stability, and cooperation on global challenges such as pandemics and climate. The Western reaction to the Russian war against Ukraine is likely to reinforce these judgments, and may be amplifying Beijing's assessment that the United States is on a trajectory to pursue overthrow of the CCP as a strategic goal.

China believes to be the defender against the US- it thinks that similar to Ukraine, a well-motivated defender can defeat seemingly stronger foe

Hooper 2022

Charles Hooper is one of the nation's foremost experts on China's military and defense industries, U.S.-China military relations, U.S. security cooperation and financial assistance, and foreign military sales. "What the Chinese Army Is Learning From Russia's Ukraine War," 7-21-2022. (<https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/07/what-the-chinese-army-is-learning-from-russias-ukraine-war?lang=en>)- JT

Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on February 24. China, as we all know, has spent a couple of decades thinking about ways to coerce Taiwan. What's happened since the 24th that might be relevant to Taiwan? Charles Hooper: I think at the very strategic military level, one of the most fundamental tenets of PLA modernization has actually been validated by the Ukraine conflict, but it's also paradoxical.

The nature of warfare never changes—the applications and violence to achieve a political end—but the character of warfare is constantly evolving. And that's what we're seeing now: an evolution of the character of warfare toward the defense, as opposed to the offense. The defense or the defending nation has an advantage here.

Russia clearly possessed an overwhelming advantage in combat power and just sheer throw weight when compared to Ukraine. But despite this, Ukraine has been able to offset this advantage by a skillful application of asymmetric military capabilities that have been supplied by its allies and partners. Now, what we need to understand is the PLA has always perceived themselves to be the defender and the United States to be the aggressor. We tend to look at it [through] the Taiwan element of it—as China being the aggressor and us being the defender—but that's not how they see it. And indeed, their entire defense modernization emphasis . . . has been specifically focused on denying the United States the ability to project power into the Western Pacific and to prevent [it] from building "mountains of iron."

Before we go to war anywhere in the world, we build a mountain of iron—in Kuwait, in Iraq, and in other places. And then we unleash this mountain of iron on whoever our foe is far from our shores. The paradox here is that while the United States is clearly the aggressor and attacker, within this paradigm, Taiwan is clearly the defender. And the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that a well-supplied, well-motivated defender can effectively disrupt or even defeat a clearly superior adversary. If nothing else, this defender can significantly increase the cost and length and duration of a military conflict to the

detriment of the attacker. So, when you look at the overall lesson here, it's the fact that this is far more complex than they might have imagined.

China is aware and not afraid of economic sanctions- as they learned from Russia

Feigenbaum and Szubin 2023

EVAN A. FEIGENBAUM is Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 2006 to 2007 and again from 2007 to 2009, he served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. ADAM SZUBIN is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. "What China Has Learned From the Ukraine War," 2-14-2023. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/what-china-has-learned-ukraine-war?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20241115)-JT

No longer can Beijing simply assume that the West will never risk economic shocks over, say, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Beijing has just witnessed the United States and its European allies take on considerable national and global risks for Ukraine, an exponentially smaller and less global economy than Taiwan's, which has the seventh largest economy in industrial Asia and provides a pivotal link in global supply chains. And Washington has greater historical, legal, and emotional ties with Taiwan than it does with Ukraine. China can no longer presume that the West will impose major sanctions only on marginal countries and marginal sanctions only on major countries.

Beijing has been surprised, too, by the ferocity of the Western response to Russia's aggression. In the wake of the 2014 Donbas invasion, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping walked away with the lesson that the West—and especially risk-averse U.S. allies, of which there are many in both Asia and Europe—would not support costly sanctions on behalf of a third party. This time, that lesson does not apply. When Moscow's tanks charged toward Kyiv, the gloves came off. An escalation ladder that had taken 18 months in the sanctions campaign against Iran was collapsed into a weekend. Even Russia's oil and gas exports, which had been seen as too important to touch in 2014, were sanctioned. The West has moved more quickly than many thought possible to wean itself off Russian oil, and the G-7 recently rolled out a price cap system aimed at depressing the price Russia receives for its crude oil and petroleum products elsewhere in the world, at the same time ensuring that energy markets are still well supplied.

Countries make strategic decisions, including for war, because leaders weigh costs and benefits and then judge that aggression is worth the risk. China will not, therefore, eschew the use of force against Taiwan merely because it fears sanctions. China will, however, try to absorb lessons from Russia's Ukraine experience about how to plug vulnerabilities, assure resilience, and create more options.

And the economies that have the depth to absorb a meaningful part of China's foreign reserves are all part of the coalition that has stood up against Russia's violation of international law. It is not clear where China can go.

China has also rolled out its own renminbi payment system, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and has set up mechanisms in its central bank to clear bilateral trade with countries such as Russia, skirting the use of the dollar and the euro. At the end of March 2022, CIPS had 1,304 participating institutions, a significant number, but about one-tenth of SWIFT's participating institutions. China's defensive steps have made more headway than Russia's—China's weight as the largest trading partner for the majority of the world gives it substantial clout in bilateral negotiations. But it will be difficult, perhaps even impossible, for China to convince the world's advanced economies to entrust global financial flows to a Chinese-run platform.

So China has more leverage than any other nation to develop workarounds and alternatives to Western platforms, protocols, and institutions, and it is working overtime to do so after 2022. But Beijing is bumping up against economic and geopolitical realities that will not allow it to subvert the global financial system or to arrange for the renminbi to supplant the dollar and the euro as the dominant international currency.

Extensions: Deterrence/Reliability

Military aid is key to deterring Chinese aggression

Montgomery 2024

Mark Montgomery is the CCTI Senior Director and Senior Fellow and Bradley Bowman is the CMPP Senior Director, "Beijing Is Listening as Americans Threaten Taiwan," 9-12-2024.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_ed/2024/09/12/beijing-is-listening-as-americans-threaten-taiwan/)-JT

The U.S. and Taiwan Must Change Course” (Sept. 3) responding to our op-ed “Can Taiwan Count on the U.S. if Trump Wins?” (Aug. 29). Mr. Colby, whom we respect as a leading voice on U.S. defense policy in the Pacific, reiterates that the U.S. has a national security interest in defending Taiwan, that Taipei should spend more on defense, and that we must take urgent steps to bolster deterrence against China.

As we clearly write in our op-ed, we agree. Our fundamental disagreement with Mr. Colby is whether it is wise for Americans to threaten that the U.S. won't defend Taiwan if it doesn't spend more on defense. We argue that threatening to abandon Taiwan undermines U.S. deterrence and increases the chance of Chinese aggression against the island, which could lead to a catastrophic war.

Mr. Colby doesn't address that central premise of our op-ed in his letter. His recent comments were obviously aimed at policy makers in Taipei to push them to spend more on defense and take other steps. That's an important audience. But Mr. Colby neglects the dangerous effect of his words on another audience: Beijing.

Deterrence is based on the perception of political will to use military capabilities. That's why public comments by former, and likely future, officials such as Mr. Colby suggesting that the U.S. wouldn't defend Taiwan are so misguided. Such words affect adversaries' calculus of U.S. political will. Previous comments by Mr. Colby suggesting the U.S. use sanctions against Taiwan don't help either.

We agree with Mr. Colby on much. Unfortunately, his recent public suggestions that the U.S. might not come to Taiwan's defense makes the nightmare scenario, which he has worked hard to prevent, more likely.

The US must prove they are trying to protect Taiwan and not just using it for its benefit

Wang Shushen is the deputy director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences "As Washington views Taiwan region as pawn, 'doubts about the US' grow in the island," 2-4-2024. (<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306647.shtml>)- JT

The process of Taiwan region's recent leadership election reflects the concerns of its society about the situation in the Taiwan Straits, while doubts about the US fluctuate. Since the US was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict with a fact that US isn't sending troops into Ukraine, and the escalating geopolitical crisis caused by the Palestine-Israel conflict, the island of Taiwan has been filled with anxiety. Furthermore, the island's confidence in US' strategic credibility and US' promise of "defense" of the Taiwan region has been undermined.

The Taiwan region is generally considered to be pro-US, and the main political parties openly express their pro-US stance. However, the Taiwan society has always harbored deep-seated doubts about the US, which occasionally surface. In 1979, the US established diplomatic relations with People's Republic of China and severed diplomatic ties with the Taiwan authorities, abolishing the mutual defense treaty. The US' abandonment of the Taiwan region caused a huge shock and high suspicion in the region.

Over the years, the "America skepticism" has been fermenting in Taiwan, which is closely related to China-US relations and the situation in the Taiwan Straits, and has manifested in the following forms.

The US is now in the process of arming Taiwan into a military "porcupine," setting the island of Taiwan as a battleground for conflict. Under such misgivings, some Taiwan scholars put forward the "Ukraine situation effect" and hold that after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the island's confidence in the "US defense of Taiwan" is declining, while support for cross-Straits dialogue is rising.

Regarding various "doubts about the US," the DPP authorities attribute them all to "cognitive warfare," vigorously avoiding the issues and shifting focus. They seek to counterbalance these concerns by emphasizing the "dependence on the US." However, in today's complex world, where the US prioritizes only its own national interests, while viewing Taiwan island merely as a pawn, Taiwan society's "doubts about the US" will continue to grow.

Taiwan needs to be militarily ready to make China not confident it can win a war

Jones 2023

Seth G. Jones is president of the Defense and Security Department and Harold Brown Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "The U.S. Industrial Base Is Not Prepared for a Possible Conflict with China," January 23, 2023. (<https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/>)- JT

In a major regional conflict—such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait—the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would likely run out of some munitions—such as long-range, precision-guided munitions.

As timelines for a possible conflict in Asia shrink, the goal should be to support the production capacity required to enable the United States and its allies and partners to deter and, if deterrence fails, fight and win at least one major theater war—if not two. “Just in time” and lean manufacturing operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity. The U.S. Department of Defense, in coordination with Congress, should develop a plan now that involves taking steps to streamline and improve production, acquisitions, replenishment, Foreign Military Sales, ITAR, and other policies and procedures. A revitalization of the defense industrial base will not happen overnight for the United States or its allies and partners. It is time to prepare for the era of competition that now exists.

Taiwan military alone cannot succeed in a war with China

Gomez 2023

Eric Gomez is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. His research focuses on the U.S. military budget and force posture, as well as arms control and nuclear stability issues in East Asia. "Taiwan's Urgent Need for Asymmetric Defense," 11-14-2023. (<https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/taiwans-urgent-need-asymmetric-defense>)- JT

Washington has a great deal of leverage over Taipei, which it should use to push Taiwan to pursue capabilities and strategies that it has been hesitant to fully embrace. Strengthening Taiwan's self-defense must not be done on either an ad hoc or “more of everything” basis. Instead, the United States and Taiwan should establish and adhere to a road map for prioritization that addresses Taiwan's most existential military challenges first.

The starting point for this road map is diagnosing Taiwan's self-defense shortcomings to establish areas where the need for change is greatest. Taiwan must be laser-focused on defeating an amphibious invasion by prevailing in two critical military operations: surviving the PLA's conventional precision strike capabilities and preventing the first wave of China's ground forces from capturing an airfield, port, or beachhead.

Taiwan should also take steps to improve the survivability of its existing traditional forces so that they are less prone to early, rapid destruction. Since these traditional forces are a sunk cost, any effort to improve their survivability should be relatively low-cost, leaving more of Taiwan's limited funds available for new asymmetric capabilities. For example, to keep its manned fighter force operationally viable for a longer period in a conflict, Taipei should build more hardened aircraft shelters instead of buying more costly missile defense systems. The cost of a new US-made Patriot missile defense battery is \$1.1 billion, while South Korea in 2020 was able to build 20 modern hardened aircraft shelters for \$125 million (\$6.25 million per shelter). Ground-based air defense systems are essential for Taiwan, but it should prioritize systems that are less expensive, more mobile, and optimized for shooting down aircraft instead of ballistic missiles. Additionally, Taiwan should eschew distributed aircraft operations that would have military aircraft use civilian airports or stretches of highway as makeshift bases. China could easily shift missile targeting to neutralize less protected civilian airports, while aircraft operating from highways would risk slowing the movement of Taiwan's ground forces.

Taipei should also push more reconnaissance and strike capabilities to smaller, lower-level ground force units so that they could operate effectively if a Chinese joint firepower campaign disrupted higher-level command and control. Such a change would require adjustments in Taiwanese military training and capabilities. On the training side, Taiwan should create more realistic, less-scripted exercises and improve small-unit combat skills. On the capabilities side, Taiwan should emulate aspects of the US Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 reforms, which put more short-range reconnaissance and strike drones under the control of platoon and company commanders.

Military Aid is key to deterring China

Thayer 2024

Bradley A. Thayer is director of China policy at the Center for Security Policy and the co-author with Lianchao Han of "Understanding the China Threat." "Taiwan as the central front: Detering China with help from key allies and India," 4-12-2023. (<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3941477-taiwan-as-the-central-front-deterring-china-with-help-from-key-allies-and-india/>)- JT

Asia will be the cockpit of great-power politics in the 21st century. Most of the world's highly skilled population lives there and most of its economic might, too. In this region, China, India, Japan, the Koreans, Russia and the United States interact in a multipolar and complex balance of power.

Among Asian states, the crucible is China and India because of their power. India just topped China in population size, and its economy is smaller than China's but is growing faster. Fortunately for the U.S., its relations with India are positive and likely to remain so as long China's ambitions and military might could potentially threaten India and the U.S.

As Chinese belligerence increases, the U.S. must respond to deter its aggression. If Washington does not, Beijing's aggression is a certainty. The U.S. response must be immediate — and bold — to deter aggression. This falls into two broad categories.

First, the U.S. must increase its own capabilities to deter China's aggression, or to wage war against China out of necessity if deterrence fails. The U.S. does not yet have the air, ground-based and naval capabilities present in the region. Nor does it have adequate integrated defenses for key bases such as Guam, or stores of armaments to ensure that its forces and its allies could be supplied in high-intensity warfare.

No matter the monetary cost of the Ukraine war, every weapon sent to Ukraine has a high opportunity cost — it might have been sent to Taiwan to deter China's aggression. This would matter less if the U.S. defense industry were mobilized to meet present, and likely future, needs, but it is not. Moreover, the U.S. does not possess the right combination of tactical and theater nuclear weapons systems to deter China's decision to employ nuclear weapons. Neither does the U.S. have the right nuclear mix to deter China from escalating from tactical nuclear weapons use to theater use, or from theater use to a strategic nuclear exchange.

Second, the U.S. must depend more on its allies and partners to assist with the deterrence mission, and to fight a war, should deterrence fail. U.S. capabilities are increasing only modestly. There is far more enthusiasm in the Biden administration for helping Ukraine to fight its war against Russian troops than for deterring Chinese aggression — particularly against Taiwan — and China's further expansion of bases in the South China Sea.

Taiwan is an essential component for the defense of U.S. interests, for five reasons. The first is economic. Taiwan has a vibrant, wealthy economy — and is a superpower in computer chip production. Any damage to its factories, including their destruction or conquest by China, will reverberate for many years throughout the U.S. and global economies. There may come a day when the United States no longer depends upon Taiwan for chips, but that day is not today — and will not be for many years.

Extensions: Military readiness

China can take Taiwan in a week

Shimbun 2023

Yomiuri Shimbun is an editor at Japan News "Japan Govt Predicts China's Forces Could Land on Taiwan Within 1 Week of Enforcing Blockade; Drills Conducted in 2023 Analyzed," 7-11-2024.

(<https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20240718-199364/>)- JT

China's military has the capability to land ground forces on Taiwan within as little as one week after imposing a naval blockade on the island, according to a Japanese government analysis of Chinese military exercises conducted last year.

The government had previously estimated Chinese forces would require about one month before putting troops ashore in an invasion of Taiwan, and it is increasingly concerned that the Chinese military

is envisaging a very short military operation that would exploit the period before the U.S. military and other forces could respond to such an incident.

The findings were based on an analysis of Chinese military exercises that were conducted over about one month in the summer of 2023. These drills practiced maneuvers involving warships and other equipment, and missiles were launched at various locations within China and its nearby waters.

According to a senior Japanese government official, analysis of the series of exercises revealed that if various Chinese military units conducted operations in parallel, Beijing's forces could land vast ground forces on Taiwan within a few days of imposing a maritime and air blockade around the island. The analysis findings were reported to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida early this year.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is predicted to begin with a maritime blockade enforced by naval vessels. This would be followed by missile attacks on Taiwan's military facilities and the insertion of military units by landing ships and transport helicopters to establish beachheads, and then the insertion of troops and tanks by landing vessels and large commercial cargo ships.

Chinese military ready to take Taiwan

Lee 2024

Yimou Lee is a Senior Correspondent for Reuters covering everything from Taiwan, including sensitive Taiwan-China relations, China's military aggression and Taiwan's key role as a global semiconductor powerhouse. "China building capacity to rapidly strike Taiwan, senior Taiwanese official says," 10-14-2024. (<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-building-capacity-rapidly-strike-taiwan-senior-taiwanese-official-says-2024-10-17/>)- JT

China is building its capacity to rapidly turn military drills into a full-out attack, a senior Taiwan security official said, providing the Taipei government's assessment of the strategic intent behind Beijing's war games around the island this week.

China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, staged large-scale drills on Monday that it said were a warning to "separatist acts" following last week's national day speech by Taiwan President Lai Ching-te. Taiwan has for the past five years complained of almost daily Chinese military activities around the island, including at least four rounds of major war games and regular "joint combat readiness patrols". "They are increasing the building up of their capacity to turn military exercises into a conflict," the official said at a briefing in Taipei, requesting anonymity to be able to speak more frankly.

Taiwan reported a record 153 Chinese aircraft took part in the drills, and the official added an unprecedented 25 Chinese navy and coast guard boats also approached close to Taiwan's 24-mile (39-km) contiguous zone. "They approached very close to Taiwan. They increased their pressure on Taiwan

and squeezed Taiwan's response time," the official said. "This drill presented more of a threat than ever before to Taiwan." The official said during the drill, China launched two missiles towards an unspecified inland area, without providing further details. "Although they did not fire missiles towards Taiwan this time, they did practice missile launches," the official said. China's defence ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. On Monday, it vowed to take further action as needed against Taiwan, while on Wednesday China's Taiwan Affairs Office said Beijing will never commit to renouncing the use of force over Taiwan.

The Taiwan official said their own intelligence had detected signs of China's drills ahead of time and deployed assets including mobile missile launchers to strategic spots before Beijing announced the war games around dawn on Monday. Lai and his government reject Beijing's sovereignty claims saying only Taiwan's people can decide their future. Lai has repeatedly offered talks, but he has been rebuffed by China. The military has already included a plan, in its annual Han Kuang war games, on ways to counter a compressed response time in case China suddenly turns its drills into a real attack, he added.

A Taipei-based diplomat familiar with security issues in the region said Beijing's war games presented a "big threat" because through the drills, China's military was quickly building up its mobilisation and combat capabilities. "The permanent state of readiness is getting higher and higher - they can switch from nothing to drills to war in no time," said the diplomat, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

China has a plan to get on Taiwanese land in 15 minutes

Alperovitch 2024

Dmitri Alperovitch is an internationally recognized thought leader on geopolitics and national security, currently serving as the cofounder and chairman of Silverado Policy Accelerator "This Is What Would Happen if China Invaded Taiwan," Jun 19, 2024. (<https://www.wired.com/story/this-is-what-would-happen-if-china-invaded-taiwan/>)-JT

The operations planners in the People's Liberation Army had had years to deliberate their invasion strategy, adjusting year after year as China's own military capabilities grew and advanced. In the end, due to the unpredictability of the rough Taiwan Strait waters and the heavy fortifications the Taiwanese had built up around potential beach landing sites, the PLA came up with an innovative invasion plan—the opening stages of which they'd practiced repeatedly as the late 2020s unfolded. For several years, China had engaged in full-scale military exercises—loading up vast armadas of military and civilian ships with tens of thousands of troops, equipment, and matériel and heading toward Taiwan, always stopping just short of the 12-nautical-mile limit that marks the start of the island's territorial waters. They figured they could practice with some impunity, because they knew Taiwan could never afford to respond aggressively.

The final Chinese PLA plan counted on precisely that Taiwanese restraint when China's ships entered Taiwan's waters and closed in on the vital northwestern coastal Port of Taipei, a modern facility completed in 2012 that boasted 4,500 feet of so-called berth space, a substantial amount of space available for cargo offloading. There the PLA planned to leverage existing infrastructure to rapidly

unload hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, heavy engineering equipment, weapons, munitions, and the logistics supplies needed for the conquest of the island.

The operational plan called for moving eight modern Type 075 Yushen-class amphibious assault ships, each with more than 30,000-ton displacement, right up to Taiwan's maritime border, while being protected by PLA Navy (PLAN) guided-missile destroyers. Xi Jinping's regime had rapidly constructed the Yushen ships specifically with this mission in mind; each was a highly capable delivery platform for air assault operations, carrying a mix of up to 28 attack and heavy transport helicopters and 800 troops. In the early morning hours, once the final order was given, 200 Z-8 and Z-20 transport helicopters, all backed up by Z-10 attack gunships, would take off from the ship landing docks and head for the Taipei port, as well as the Taoyuan International Airport, 10 miles south, and the smaller Taipei Songshan Airport, located right in the center of the capital city, just three miles north of the Zhongzheng government district. The plan called for helicopters to make the journey in 10 minutes.

Having exercised each element of the plan for years, including simulated fast LCAC-boat city assaults on the Pearl River near Hong Kong, Xi Jinping's military generals assured him that the plan would achieve a rapid conquest of Taiwan before the rest of the world, especially the United States, had a chance to intervene to save the island.

Chinese control of Taiwan has grave global implications

Buchan 2023

Noah Buchan is an editor of Taipei Times "The world after a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan," 7-14-2023. (<https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2023/07/14/2003803158>)- JT

From the proliferation of nuclear weapons to a loss of faith in democracy, six security experts analyze the impact a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have on their countries and the globe. Nuclear weapons would proliferate. Global trade would end. The semiconductor industry would be destroyed or come under the control of an expansionist and authoritarian regime. Democracies would face a crisis of legitimacy and the alliance system developed and led by the US since World War II would be shattered. These are some of the predictions made in a report by six national security specialists if the People's Republic of China (PRC) attacked Taiwan and Taipei fell. It makes for grim reading.

The World After Taiwan's Fall says that such an event "would likely be far-reaching and deeply negative, perhaps even catastrophic" to not only Taiwan, but the Asia-Pacific region and the globe. It argues that the US and its allies have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan would generate. And they haven't planned for this possibility.

"Put bluntly," editors David Santoro and Ralph Cossa write in the introduction, "today neither the US government nor allied governments (let alone the respective publics) have sufficiently assessed the strategic implications of a successful PRC invasion of Taiwan. There is still a lack of urgency about the severity and gravity of this problem and the impact for them, the region and the world, should the island

of Taiwan fall into Chinese hands.” Mataka Kamiya says that a successful attack on Taiwan by China would shatter the security system of the US, having an equally detrimental effect on the world’s liberal democracies and their ability to provide each other with security guarantees.

“[A successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan] would change Japan’s security environment fundamentally. Any discussion for Japan of Taiwan’s fall should have this fact as its starting point,” writes Kamiya, a professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan.

Kamiya writes that most Japanese security experts he interviewed believe that the US can prevail against China if it attacked Taiwan — if, that is, it sends serious reinforcements. If Taiwan is taken, these experts reason, the US did not provide meaningful support, so “the confidence of regional countries in the US willingness to commit to regional security will collapse.”

Most Taiwan citizens do not want to change the status quo

Maguire 2022

Dannielle Maguire is a digital producer for the National News Desk at ABC Brisbane "China's already a very big country. What does it want with Taiwan?," 8-1-2022. (<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-12/why-does-china-want-taiwan-military-strategic-location/101321856>)- JT

There's a long history of tension between China and Taiwan and the global ramifications of this are complicated — even for experts keeping up with every development. China has never recognized Taiwan's government, viewing it as a breakaway province. It had set a deadline to unite the mainland with the island by 2049, but things appear to be heating up now.

This week China put out a document detailing plans for "reunification" after a week of conducting military drills near the island. Here's a quick guide to get you up to speed on the situation. This would fuel the Chinese government's push for rising nationalism. There's also the matter of Taiwan's geography — being able to set up bases further into the Pacific Ocean would extend China's military reach and intimidate nations in the region.

Controlling Taiwan would disrupt the US geographical security concept known as the "island chain strategy", which is essentially a barrier of islands between the Chinese mainland and the Western Pacific ocean. If China controlled Taiwan, it could then control Asia's major shipping routes, the Australian Institute of International Affairs says. And let's not forget about money.

Taiwan's gross domestic product was nearly \$US790 billion in 2021, according to the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook from April. While it points out this pales in comparison to China's \$17.5 trillion, the white paper highlights the economic advantages of reclaiming Taiwan: "Taiwan boasts a high level of economic growth, industries with distinctive local features, and robust foreign trade.

"Its economy is highly complementary with that of the mainland." During his address at the National Press Club earlier this week, China's ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian said he believed the "majority of the people in Taiwan believe they're Chinese".

But a poll by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council last year says that's not the case. It found only 1.6 per cent of Taiwanese people said they supported unification with China. However, only 6.8 per cent said Taiwan should declare independence as soon as possible. Most people — a whopping 84.9 per cent — supported maintaining the "status quo".