

**Resolved: The benefits of European Union enlargement outweigh the harms.**

## Research Questions

Use the questions below to help guide your research. This topic has a long history and is backed by several processes that are good to understand. However, at the end of the day try to remember that you simply need to examine enlargement and not necessarily all of its nuts and bolts. While this is true, knowing the nuts and bolts will also put you ahead and help to inform the types of contentions you are running.

What exactly is EU enlargement?

What is the process of enlargement?

Who is involved?

Who might react if one country is admitted over another?

What motivates countries to apply for membership?

What are the criteria for countries to be accepted into the EU?

What countries are in the EU?

What countries are on the waitlist?

Does enlargement mean anything else in this context?

What might motivate the EU to enlarge?

How long does it typically take for a country to be fully admitted? Are there exceptions?

What does this mean for Russian expansionism?

Is EU expansionism good only for the EU?

What exactly does the EU regulate?

## Extra Sources

<https://new.debateus.org/resolved-the-benefits-of-european-union-enlargement-outweigh-the-harms/>

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/want-ukraine-in-the-eu-youll-have-to-reform-the-eu-too/>

<https://www.politico.eu/article/european-union-membership-enlargement-turkey-albania-north-macedonia-montenegro-ukraine-moldova/>

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-next-european-union-member-is/>

<https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/after-years-delay-western-balkans-hope-progress-joining-101374472>

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/17/ukraine-eu-european-union-nato-membership-reform-subsidies-budget-reconstruction-agriculture-war-russia/>

<https://www.politico.eu/article/enlargements-back-on-the-political-agenda/>

<https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eu-enlargement-and-the-resolution-of-bilateral-disputes-in-the-western-balkans/>

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement-neighbourhood/opinion/the-us-is-indispensable-in-the-western-balkans-for-now/>

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/french-minister-says-eu-enlargement-must-be-decided-by-years-end/>

<https://www.ft.com/content/1389f010-3bbc-4814-91e9-dafb64d4df70>

<https://www.ft.com/content/ef6d8575-149a-4f9f-a450-30e7da9d706b>

<https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-in-2035-bigger-messier-tougher/>

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/27/ukraines-war-has-made-europe-a-home/>

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# Resolutional Analysis

# Observation 1: Definitions

## 1. Benefits

First, benefits, as **defined by the Cambridge Dictionary** (last accessed July 31, 2023; <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/benefit>), **is a helpful or good effect.**

## 2. European Union (EU)

The European Union (EU), **is defined by Britannica** (Last accessed July 31, 2023; <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union>) **as the: international organization comprising 27 European countries and governing common economic, social, and security policies.** Originally confined to western Europe, the EU undertook a robust expansion into central and eastern Europe in the early 21st century. The EU's members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The United Kingdom, which had been a founding member of the EU, left the organization in 2020. **The EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty**, which entered into force **on November 1, 1993.** The treaty was **designed to enhance European political and economic integration by creating a single currency (the euro), a unified foreign and security policy, and common citizenship rights and by advancing cooperation in the areas of immigration, asylum, and judicial affairs.** The EU was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2012, in recognition of the organization's efforts to promote peace and democracy in Europe.

## 3. Enlargement

**According to the European Commission** (last accessed July 31, 2023; [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/eu-enlargement\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/eu-enlargement_en)) **enlargement, specifically in context of the EU, applies to countries currently aspiring to join the EU and potential candidates.** The prospect of membership is a powerful stimulus for democratic and economic reforms in countries that want to become EU members. **Current candidate countries include: Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine.** Bosnia, Herzegovina, Georgia, and Kosovo are potential candidates.

## 4. Harms

**The Cambridge Dictionary** (Last accessed July 31, 2023; <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/harm>) **defines Harm as damage done to something, specifically economic, environmental, and financial damage.**

## **Observation 2: Judging Criterion (framework)**

A topic such as this, rooted in geopolitical conversations, requires us to consider the impact of political decisions on a net-beneficial scale. As such, the judge should weigh the possible outcomes of the affirmative against the negative and vote for the team that provides the proves a net-positive for the resolution.

# **Contention 1: Global Imperative**

## Subpoint A: Changes for Ukraine

### Democratic Future

**Matthijs, M. (2022, June 28).** Matthias Matthijs is senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations and associate professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is an award-winning author and teacher, and an expert on European political economy, the politics of economic ideas, and regional integration. He also served as the chair of the executive committee of the European Union Studies Association from 2019 to 2021. "Ukraine Could Become an EU Member. What Would That Mean?". **Council on Foreign Relations**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-could-become-eu-member-what-would-mean>

On February 28, 2022, **four days after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy requested his country's immediate admission to the European Union (EU). The European Commission responded by recommending Ukraine be elevated to candidate status (along with Moldova)**, and in June, the twenty-seven EU leaders unanimously approved that recommendation. **While the path to full membership is likely to be long and arduous, gaining candidacy has clarified the stakes of the conflict for the Ukrainian people.** Ukraine's battle against Russian aggression is more likely to hinge on increased Western financial and military support, as well as continued tightening of anti-Russia sanctions. Still, **EU candidate status does give the Ukrainian people a welcome morale boost, as they now know what they are fighting for: a free, democratic future in which they are more fully integrated with the West and a real prospect—however far in the future—of EU membership, with all the rights and responsibilities that entails.**

### Judiciary Reform

**Law, T. (2023, February 28).** Tara Law is a reporter at TIME. She works on the accolades team, where she helps lead long-term projects, including TIME100 Next, TIME100 Companies and TIME100 Inventions. She has also covered topics ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic, to the drug overdose epidemic, to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. "What Joining the European Union Would Mean for Ukraine—and the Alliance". **Time**. Retrieved from: <https://time.com/6252592/ukraine-european-union-summit-membership/>

Even those who are optimistic about Ukraine's chances of joining the E.U. argue that the process will be challenging. Ukraine would need to conduct an extensive set of reforms, including fighting corruption, incorporating E.U. law, and reforming its judiciary. **"If Ukraine is at the point where it joins the European Union, it will already be dramatically changed. Ukraine will not get in as charity," says Maria Popova, an associate professor at McGill University studying political development in Ukraine and the Russo-Ukrainian War. These changes would come with tremendous value for Ukrainians. For instance, says Popova, while public trust in the judiciary is very low, reform could lead to an "independent, impartial, effective judiciary."**

## **Subpoint B: EU Security**

### **Key to Security**

**Bergmann, M., Svendsen, O., & Martinez, S. (2023, May 25).** Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS he was a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focused on Europe, Russia, and U.S. security cooperation. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state's policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then secretary of state John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Before serving in the State Department, Bergmann worked at the Center for American Progress as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann holds a master's degree in comparative politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a bachelor's degree in political science from Bates College. His recent commentary has been published in outlets such as *Politico* (March 2022, August 2022), the *Washington Post*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Sasakawa USA*. Otto Svendsen is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe. Prior to joining CSIS, Otto was affiliated with Albright Stonebridge Group, the Atlantic Council, and the National Democratic Institute. He holds an MSc in international relations from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a BSc in international business from Copenhagen Business School. Sissy Martinez is a program coordinator and research assistant for the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Martinez was a Joseph S. Nye Jr. national security intern for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She has prior work experience at the Institute for Economics and Peace in Brussels, on Capitol Hill, and on the campaign finance team for former congressman Antonio Delgado, who is now lieutenant governor of New York State. Martinez holds an MS in terrorism and homeland security policy and a BA in political science and justice and law from the School of Public Affairs at American University. "The European Union's Enlargement Conundrum". **Center for Strategic and International Studies.** Retrieved from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-unions-enlargement-conundrum>

**Membership in the European Union is critical for Ukraine's reconstruction and future prosperity. A clear path to membership could serve as a catalyst for investment and growth given the European Union's strong regulatory framework and history of economic integration.** But the European Union is suffering from "enlargement fatigue" and has essentially slammed the door for new members. **Incorporating Ukraine will likely also require the European Union to reform itself to enable greater decisionmaking flexibility, a new distribution of funds, and the ability to discipline member states for democratic backsliding and rule of law violations.** This report examines the question of Ukraine's EU accession and explains why enlargement, seen as the European Union's most successful policy, has stalled. It explores past examples of EU enlargement and what lessons can be learned for both Ukraine and the European Union. It also examines what role, if any, the United States can play in Ukraine's potential accession. **EU enlargement is critical, not just to Ukraine but to the Balkans and European security, and is therefore of paramount importance to the United States.** While enlargement will always be an internal EU process, this report argues there are diplomatic, economic, and military steps the United States can take to help encourage the process from a distance.

## **Subpoint C: Unification**

### **Enlargement is Necessary for the Future of the EU**

**Delić, G. (2022, June 1).** Gordana Delić is the regional director of the GMF Balkans program and deputy managing director of the Transatlantic Trusts. Previously she was director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a GMF project. She has over 17 years of experience in the nonprofit sector in the area of civil society development, with extensive experience in program management and development, grant solicitation, corporate philanthropy, research and planning, election processes, get-out-to vote campaigns, human rights, and reconciliation. Delić has knowledge of both the nongovernmental and governmental sectors in the Balkans, as well as of international donor strategies, programs, procedures, and operations in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe. Prior to joining the Balkan Trust for Democracy, Delić worked at Freedom House Serbia. Her international experience includes six years of work on different democracy development programs in Slovakia. Delić is fluent in Serbian, English, and Slovak. She also communicates in Czech, German, and Spanish. “Victory for Ukraine Will Also Be Defined by EU Enlargement”. **German Marshall Fund**. Retrieved from: <https://www.gmfus.org/news/victory-ukraine-will-also-be-defined-eu-enlargement>

For Europe, this war on its soil of unprecedented scale since the Second World War is an existential matter. The outcomes of this war will define and shape its future. Russia’s initial attempt at a blitzkrieg failed and the prolonged war has brought new, unexpected developments and side effects. It has revealed the weakness of the aggressor, united the West in an unprecedented way, and made **the idea of “Europe whole and at peace” more vital than ever**. The latter so much so that Sweden and Finland have decided to join NATO. This was neither a short-term, nor an easy decision on their part but a rather strategic move proving that the future stability and peace of the whole continent lies in a unity that is firm and unquestionable. To achieve this goal, **Europe must secure its entire eastern flank from north to south**. The definition of victory in this war asks for moral, political, and territorial goals. The recently mentioned Marshall Plan for Ukraine will therefore be the new, 21st century Marshall Plan for Europe too. As for the territorial goals, only Ukrainians have the right to decide what is acceptable. The moral and political goals, however, envision the West helping Ukraine rebuild itself while firmly offering it the prospect of joining the EU. The recent idea to offer Ukraine the status of the EU candidate country normally would have been a strong political statement if there were not other countries in Southeastern Europe that have been waiting in line for decades. For Ukrainians to believe that the offer is real, clear signs of progress are needed soon. It is naïve to believe that Ukraine is not taking notice of the saga around the EU’s formal decision to begin accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia. **The EU, on the other hand, will have to significantly speed up the process with all current and future candidates if it wants to secure its prosperity, stability, and peace. The request for a fast track to membership is genuine and justified, and it does not call for disrespecting or avoiding the existing process. But it does mean a much, much more palpable, energetic, transparent, and above all sincere approach by the EU**—and potentially making the process more political, as France’s President Emmanuel Macron suggested. Regardless of how logical or understandable the arguments for first deepening and only then enlarging the EU are, **the current situation calls for action that is bolder and decisive. The soft underbelly of Europe in its southeast is another potentially weak spot. After all, twice in the last decade has Russia invaded Ukraine by using the example of Kosovo for justification. Ideas to reorganize the EU from within around core countries no doubt results from a sincere desire to make the union more functional and stable**. However, one must wonder if this can ever appeal to the younger generations born in the EU but not in these core countries. To them, this arrangement does not answer the needs of the modern, digital 21st century nor it is fair. **It is impossible to imagine, especially in the current context, that any EU member in Central and Eastern Europe would opt for a solution that resembles 19th century empire and willingly sign a new treaty that would make them second-class citizens of the union. Add to that the immediate proximity of Russia and an unstable Ukraine with weak, if any, prospects of joining the EU and the calculus for these members is clear. Russia is currently gaining ground in Ukraine and negotiations do not seem to be in sight**. President Volodymyr Zelensky has stated that the war will need to end through diplomatic efforts and not by force. So, while this war will eventually end, its aftermath is being decided now. **For Ukraine—and Europe and the West—victory or loss to a great extent will be defined by the EU’s will to make a difficult and brave,**

**effort at enlargement. After all, the Balkan countries and Ukraine are already deeply integrated into the EU, their national legislations have long been aligned with EU directives in various sectors, and the EU has a lot to gain from accepting them as members.**

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## **Observation 2: Judging Criterion (framework)**

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## **Contention 1: The EU is kind of a mess**

## **Subpoint A: It's really not that simple**

**Toygür, I. & Bergmann, M. (2023, July 17).** Ilke Toygür is a senior associate in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer at Carlos III University. Max Bergmann is the director of the Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies and the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, both at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a former senior advisor in the U.S. State Department. "The EU Isn't ready for Ukraine to Join". **Foreign Policy**. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/17/ukraine-eu-european-union-nato-membership-reform-subsidies-budget-reconstruction-agriculture-war-russia/>

But while Ukraine is working at pace to join the EU, **Brussels and the bloc's member states are not doing nearly enough to be ready to absorb Ukraine. EU leaders' high-flying rhetoric on Ukraine's membership therefore does not match their actions.** To absorb a country with the size, population, low income level, financing, and reconstruction needs of war-torn Ukraine, **it would require a major reform of EU institutions, policies, and budget processes. At the very least, this will set off vicious conflicts between current members about the distribution of EU funds.** Therefore, if EU leaders were really serious about membership for Ukraine, efforts to reform the bloc should already be underway. At the heart of the issue is the EU budget, which is dominated by two major elements: agricultural subsidies and development projects in poorer regions, which combined account for roughly 65 percent of the EU's long-term budget. For both these issues, prospective Ukrainian membership is explosive. Ukraine is one of the poorest countries in Europe, with a per capita income of barely one-tenth of the EU average and less than half that of the EU's poorest member, Bulgaria. Ukraine also now has vast infrastructure and reconstruction needs. To all of this, add one of the continent's largest agricultural sectors that would suddenly be eligible for EU subsidies. **Were the EU's budget and redistribution process to remain unchanged, Kyiv would immediately suck in a vast part of the EU budget, including funds now going to the bloc's less affluent members in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.** Many countries currently benefiting from EU funds would turn into net contributors overnight. If you think any of this will be a smooth process, then you don't know much about European politics. Given the current redistribution of funds within the EU, it's no surprise that the biggest cracks in support for Ukrainian membership have come in Eastern Europe, where the EU's net recipients are concentrated. In fact, the battle over giving Ukraine access to European agricultural markets has already started, long before a single euro in EU farming subsidies is reallocated: Following the invasion, Brussels supported Ukraine by allowing its grain and other agricultural products to enter the EU's single market. Cheaper Ukrainian goods undercut farmers in neighboring Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Even though Ukraine was desperate for revenue, Poland violated EU rules and unilaterally blocked Ukrainian grain from entering Polish territory. The EU intervened with a compromise, allowing Ukrainian produce to enter the EU but requiring it to bypass five Eastern European countries most affected by the unwelcome competition. **It is also no surprise, then, that some of these Eastern European countries—which count among Ukraine's biggest military and diplomatic backers—also oppose any serious effort to undertake the EU reforms that are a prerequisite for Ukraine to join. Not only do these countries potentially stand to lose substantial funds, but EU reforms to prepare the way for Ukrainian membership will also likely include streamlining EU decision-making rules, which could reduce individual members' power, especially countries such as Hungary and Poland that have made liberal use of their veto power to influence EU decisions.** EU enlargement is one of the most successful political, economic, and social policies in history, peacefully expanding the union to incorporate 450 million people in 27 countries. For new members, entering the bloc has often set off an economic miracle—a combination of market access, EU funding, the bloc's rules on good governance, and the confidence that comes with having a secure future. Yet for the past decade, further enlargement has been on ice, largely because the redistribution involved when new, usually poor, members join has been so politically wrought. Since Zelensky submitted an official application for EU membership on Feb. 28, 2022, just four days after the start of the Russian invasion, the question of further enlargement has been back on the table. Besides membership for Ukraine and Moldova, EU leaders are increasingly aware that other countries not yet in the EU—specifically, in the Western Balkans—will also have to be brought on board if European security and stability is to be ensured. The explosive impact of Ukraine's membership on the EU budget will force a discussion about the EU forging a fiscal union. In essence, that would mean a large increase in contributions by wealthier members, such as Germany, France, and some of the smaller rich countries; EU-wide income and other progressive taxes; a big increase in the EU's ability to issue its own debt; or all of the above. Obviously, this is no minor discussion. **Further enlargement would also strain the EU's already handicapped ability to make decisions and adopt new laws and policies. Reaching unanimity—needed in foreign policy, for example—among 27 sovereign member states is already a Herculean task, complicated further by the presence of an illiberal, Russia-friendly state such as Hungary. Adding Ukraine and other countries patiently waiting to join could**

**push the EU to well past 30 members. There is a long history of members weaponizing their veto power, which explains why other member states hesitate to add more countries to the decision-making mix without changes to the EU's functioning.** Germany, for example, is pushing for the expansion of qualified majority voting to new policy areas, such as foreign policy. No longer requiring unanimity would significantly streamline the ability of the EU to make foreign-policy decisions. Smaller countries fear that losing their veto would mean losing their voice in the EU—a debate familiar to any student of constitutional history. Other potential concerns relate to the distribution of member of the European Commission—currently one commissioner per member—or seats in the European Parliament. Enlargement would require reform in these areas, too. **Enlargement would also spotlight the unresolved issue of rule of law and democracy. The EU defines itself as a union of democracies and has strict rules on civil rights, and there are deep concerns over democratic decline and the rollback of the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. Western European governments, in particular, are very wary of enlarging without strengthening the EU's ability to act against democratic erosion. This concern is especially acute since not a single country on the candidate list is rated fully free in Freedom House's 2023 Freedom in the World index.** Ukraine could be the catalyst to jump-start a new wave of enlargement. The prospect of its membership requires reform, which in turn would remove many of the obstacles that have similarly held up the accession of Western Balkan countries. Russia's brutal attack on Ukraine has already been a catalyst for the EU in another way—by demonstrating to Europeans that their bloc is indispensable to their security. When it comes to defense, in survey after survey, Europeans want the EU to play a much greater role. Critically, support for Ukraine among EU citizens remains incredibly high. Even after a year of sanction packages, millions of refugees, energy decoupling, and a cost-of-living crisis, 74 percent of EU citizens approve of the bloc's support for Ukraine, according to a Eurobarometer poll. Ukrainians are fighting for their European future. EU leaders now need to do their part to be ready to bring in Ukraine. If they pursue the long-overdue reforms of EU institutions and processes that will be required to make Ukrainian membership work, they will not just make the EU larger. They will make it stronger as well.

## **Subpoint B: EU lacks proper support for expansion**

**Bechev, D. (2022, June 2).** Bechev is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where he focuses on Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. “What Has Stopped EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans?”. **Carnegie Europe.** Retrieved from: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/20/what-has-stopped-eu-enlargement-in-western-balkans-pub-87348>

The war in Ukraine has underscored the heft as well as the limits of the EU. Putin decided to invade a neighboring country in order to prevent it from integrating, slowly but steadily, into the union’s institutions and market. What is at stake is the much-debated power of attraction of the EU. Ukrainian refugees are seeking safety in the member states west of their country’s borders. In response to the invasion, Kyiv has lodged a formal membership application and is expecting to hear back from the European Council during the council’s June 23–24 meetings about whether the country will be granted candidate status. The EU is furthermore flexing its geopolitical muscles: providing weapons to Ukraine and sanctioning Russia to bring up the costs of Russia’s aggression. At the same time, the EU is underperforming on other fronts. **It is having a hard time convincing countries aspiring to join the union to adhere to its sanctions. Serbia is a case in point.** Though Belgrade supported the UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Putin’s invasion and even introduced several symbolic measures targeting Russia’s ally Belarus and the family of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, it has refused to discontinue flights by the national carrier, Air Serbia, to and from Moscow. **As in 2014, the Serbian government is reluctant to implement trade and financial sanctions too. Cutting imports of Russian natural gas, a goal outlined by the European Commission, is not in the cards either, as Belgrade recently secured a new supply deal with Moscow. The situation is replicated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Serb leader Milorad Dodik, currently a member of the state’s tripartite presidency, has effectively vetoed any punitive measures against Russia.** While Brussels is showing its teeth to the Kremlin, **EU enlargement is falling flat when it comes to motivating the Western Balkans to follow Brussels’s lead. But there is more bad news too. Enlargement is supposed to anchor democracy and help entrench the rule of law in the EU. New member governments would implement reforms and be rewarded by the union. But the evidence that this is actually happening—or indeed that this has ever been the case, even at the peak of the EU’s influence in the 2000s—is scant.** Hungary and Poland, two member states that joined in 2004, have been paragons of democratic backsliding: the progressive dismantlement of the rule of law, encroachment on media freedom, and harassment of civil society. In the Western Balkans, it is more appropriate to speak of democratic stagnation. Though the situation differs from country to country, **international watchdogs that keep tabs on democracy record, in general, no major improvements or dramatic drops.** The exception, of course, is Serbia, which was downgraded by Freedom House from “free” to “partly free” in 2019. EU accession negotiations, ongoing since 2014, do not appear to have affected the country’s domestic trajectory. The elections on April 3, 2022, saw President Aleksandar Vučić securing a new five-year presidential term, even though the opposition made gains in parliament and in the capital Belgrade. Still, Vučić’s dominance over the political system remains near-complete.

**Contention 2: The EU is self-interested &**  
**Expansion hurts refugees**

## **Subpoint A: The EU member states are united in racism**

Sanallah, N. (2023, June 20). ENAR Communications and press manager. "European Leaders Put a Shocking €20,000 Price on the Lives of Racialized Migrants". **European Network Against Racism**. Retrieved from: <https://www.enar-eu.org/european-leaders-put-a-shocking-e20000-price-on-the-lives-of-racialised-migrants/>

**The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) strongly condemns the new Pact on Migration and Asylum recently agreed upon by the Council of the European Union** under the Swedish Presidency. While hailed as a triumph of collaboration by Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, **this agreement exposes a disturbing truth: solidarity within the European Union (EU) is now deemed flexible and available for a price tag. While EU member states assert that the pact is not intended to exclude racialised communities from Europe but rather to address irregular migration, it fails to provide accessible regular pathways for all migrants. Persons belonging to racialised communities and formerly colonised countries frequently encounter significant obstacles in obtaining permits and legal pathways, thereby compelling them to seek alternative, often irregular, routes. Consequently, despite the absence of explicit references to race, ethnicity, or national origin, the new border management rules are disproportionately impacting these racialised groups. "Less than a week after EU member states agreed on this new deal, a boat carrying about 750 migrants capsized near the coast of Pylos, Greece. However, we must be reminded that is not an unexpected tragedy. This is a direct consequence of Europe's border policies and disregard for the lives of asylum seekers and migrants.** There needs to be a serious investigation into the roles of Frontex and Greek authorities in this tragedy," shared Emmanuel Achiri, ENAR Policy and Advocacy Advisor on Migration. **This plan sharply contrasts the dignified and united response of EU member states to the displacement of Ukrainian refugees. Regrettably, the new agreement aims to diminish protection standards for racialised people on the move within Europe.** According to the Commission's own data, the majority of first-time asylum applicants in 2022 were from Asia (30%), Africa (21%), and the Middle East (20%). This double standard is striking and perpetuates the discriminatory approach that differentiates between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees seeking safety from the violence in Ukraine. **To exacerbate matters further, instead of fostering a solidarity mechanism based on respect for human rights and dignity, this agreement incentivises member states to relinquish their responsibility to relocate migrants in exchange for a meager sum of €20,000.** This so-called "mandatory solidarity," celebrated as a milestone, reduces solidarity to a commodity. In essence, the worth assigned to the life and dignity of a migrant from a racialised background is reduced to a monetary value. Such a proposition not only flagrantly disregards international and European norms of protection and human rights law but also mirrors a practice reminiscent of medieval Europe. Today, these actions find no place within a Europe that prides itself on being a community founded on inclusivity and respect for human rights. "Despite the rhetoric on inclusion and respect for human rights from European leaders, this new plan betrays the spirit of the EU Action Plan Against Racism. It fails to recognise the intersectionality of racism and the specific vulnerability of migrants and refugees, neglecting the rising xenophobia and racism directed toward this group," stated Ojeaku Nwabuzo, Director of Policy, Advocacy, and Network Development at ENAR. "At its worst, this pact reinforces the racialisation of migration and sends a global message that the life and dignity of racialised peoples, both within and at the borders of Europe, are valued at a mere €20,000." ENAR calls upon the European Union to reevaluate this agreement and uphold its commitment to human rights, solidarity, and inclusive values. The EU must ensure that the rights and well-being of all migrants and refugees, irrespective of their racial or ethnic background, are protected and respected.

# Extra Cards

## New EU Enlargement should be set to meet year 2030

**Buras, P. & Morina, E. (2023, July 3).** Piotr Buras is the head of ECFR's Warsaw office and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. His topics of focus include Germany's EU and foreign policy, Poland in the EU, and EU politics. Buras is a journalist, author and expert on German and European politics. Between 2008 and 2012 he worked as a columnist and Berlin correspondent for Gazeta Wyborcza, the biggest Polish daily newspaper. He started his professional career in the late 1990s at the Center for International Relations in Warsaw, one of the first Polish think-tanks. He continued his career at the Institute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham and at the University of Wroclaw (Poland). He was also a visiting fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin. His recent book Moslems and the Other Germans. The Reinvention of the Berlin Republic was published in Polish in 2011. Engjellushe Morina is a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. She works from ECFR's Berlin office. Morina has more than 18 years' experience of research on, and fieldwork in, the Western Balkans, Euro-Atlantic integration, peacebuilding and conflict transformation, violent extremism, and dialogue and mediation. Prior to joining ECFR, she developed and led collaborative research projects on violent extremism and managed other initiatives such as a 1.5 track dialogue in North Macedonia. During the high-level negotiations over Kosovo's political status led by President Marti Ahtisaari, she served as an expert and consultant in the Cultural Heritage group within the Unity Team (2005-2007). Her work focused on the protection of Cultural and Religious Heritage in Kosovo. Morina co-founded and ran the Pristina Council on Foreign Relations. She was the executive director of Kosovar Stability Initiative and worked for the US Embassy in Pristina. Morina has also conducted fieldwork in Egypt, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Morina holds degrees from University College London (Institute of Archaeology), Oxford University (Somerville College), and the Hertie School of Governance, in Berlin. "Vision 2030: Four steps towards the new EU enlargement", **European Council on Foreign Relations**. Retrieved from: <https://ecfr.eu/article/vision-2030-four-steps-towards-the-new-eu-enlargement/>.

**In the wake of Russia's war on Ukraine, the long-stalled ambition to accept new members of the European Union has experienced a remarkable revival. In June 2022, the EU granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, and in May 2023 President Emmanuel Macron declared he would like to see enlargement take place "as swiftly as possible". This is a major shift: in the past, Paris perceived the accession of new members as a threat to the EU's cohesion. Now it views this as a prerequisite of European sovereignty.** There is reason to hope that this time things will differ. But supporters of enlargement should be under no illusions. The enthusiasm to welcome in new members could evaporate as quickly as it rose from the ashes of Bucha and Kramatorsk. Scepticism and concerns about the prospects for an enlarged union are still widespread, and these powerful currents will inevitably resurface. This was shown by the recent grain dispute, when even Kyiv's strongest supporters, such as Warsaw, sought to prevent the entry of Ukrainian agricultural products into the single market. **Quick and bold actions by the EU are therefore necessary while political energy remains potent.** The EU summit in December 2023 under the Spanish presidency is the moment for the bloc to set out what it will do to make this a reality. It will need to put in place a functional plan to be able to accept the Western Balkans countries and the trio of former Soviet states Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The EU should do four things: set a target date of 2030 for enlargement; agree a plan to adapt EU policies to accept new members; formulate a 'Madrid criterion' of foreign policy alignment for aspiring members; and grant Kosovo candidate status.

